Test score disclosure and school performance

In this paper we test whether the disclosure of test scores has direct impacts on student performance, school composition and school inputs. We take advantage of the discontinuity on the disclosure rules of The National Secondary Education Examination (ENEM) run in Brazil by the Ministry of Education: In 2006 it was established that the 2005 mean score results would be disclosed for schools with ten or more students who took the exam in the previous year. We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the e ects of test disclosure. Our results indicate that private schools that had their average scores released in 2005 outperformed those that did not by 0.2-0.6 in 2007. We did not nd same results for public schools. Moreover, we did not nd evidence that treated schools adjusted their inputs or that there was major changes in the students composition of treated schools. These ndings allow us to interpret that the main mechanism driving the di erences in performance was the increased levels of students', teachers' and principals' e ort exerted by those in schools that had scores publicized.

Drug battles and school achievement: evidence from Rio de Janeiro's favelas

This paper examines the effects of armed conflicts between drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro's favelas on student achievement. We explore variation in violence that occurs across time and space when gangs battle over territories. Within-school estimates indicate that students from schools exposed to violence score less in math exams. The effect of violence increases with conflict intensity, duration, and proximity to exam dates; and decreases with the distance between the school and the conflict location. Finally, we find that school supply is an important mechanism driving the achievement results; armed conflicts are significantly associated with higher teacher absenteeism, principal turnover, and temporary school closings.

Growth,distribution and school policy

This paper investigates the relationship between growth, income inequality, and educational policies. An endogenous growth model is built in which there are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and the quality of the labor force (measured by the fraction of skilled workers) will ultimately determine the economic growth rate. We show that multi pIe inequality and growth paths may arise. Countries will not necessarily converge to the same economic growth and income distribution. When the proportion of skilled workers is low, the economy grows slow, and the Gini coeflicient is high. Low expected growth rate inhibits investments in human capital and the quality of the labor force tomorrow turns out to be low again, keeping the economy in the bad equilibrium. We then analyze the effects on growth and inequality of two types of government intervention: introduction of public schools and vouchers. Both types can induce the economic agents to invest more in education. The consequence will be an increase in the quality of the labor force, leading to higher growth rates and less inequality. Finally, we examine the welfare consequences of these interventions and conclude that they may be Pareto improving.

The long-term effects of conditional cash transfers on child labor and school enrollment

This paper investigates the long-term e ects of conditional cash transfers on school attainment and child labor. To this end, we construct a dynamic heterogeneous agent model, calibrate it with Brazilian data, and introduce a policy similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Fam lia. Our results suggest that this type of policy has a very strong impact on educational outcomes, sharply increasing primary school completion. The conditional transfer is also able to reduce the share of working children from 22% to 17%. We then compute the transition to the new steady state and show that the program actually increases child labor over the short run, because the transfer is not enough to completely cover the schooling costs, so children have to work to be able to comply with the program's schooling eligibility requirement. We also evaluate the impacts on poverty, inequality, and welfare.

The long term effects of Bolsa Família on child labour and school enrolment

In this paper we study the e ects of conditional cash transfers in school enrolment and tackling child labour. We develop a dynamic heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model, where households face a set of tradeo s while allocating their children's time in leisure activities, schooling and working. We calibrate the model using data from the Brazilian survey PNAD, before the policy was implemented, in order to quantify the e ects of a conditional transfer. We then evaluate the results of a policy experiment that implements a conditional cash transfer scheme similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Fam lia. Our results suggest that the program, in the long term, is able to substantially increase school registration and reduce child labour and poverty. In addition, we nd out that a progressive conditional cash transfer results is even more e ective in tackling child labour and increasing school enrolment.

The long term effects of Bolsa Família on child labour and school enrollment

Neste trabalho, estudamos os impactos de transfer^encias condicionais de renda sobre o trabalho e a educa c~ao infantis. Para tanto, desenvolvemos modelo din^amico de equil brio geral com agentes heterog^eneos, onde as fam lias enfrentam tradeo s com rela c~ao a aloca c~ao de tempo das crian cas em atividades de lazer, em escolaridade e em trabalhar. O modelo e calibrado usando dados da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra em Domic lios, de modo que podemos quanti car os efeitos de uma pol tica de transfer^encia de renda. Finalmente, avaliamos o impacto de um pol tica semelhante ao atual Bolsa Fam lia. Nossos resultados sugerem que o programa, no longo prazo, e capaz de induzir um aumento substancial na escolaridade, al em de ser efetivo na redu c~ao do trabalho infantil e da pobreza. Al em disso, mostramos que um programa progressivo de transfer^encia condicional de renda resulta em benef cios ainda maiores.