A paridade do poder de compra: existe um quebra-cabeça?

Este trabalho tem como objetivo mostrar que o “quebra-cabeça” é na verdade um artefato estatístico, produzido pelo fato de que a taxa de câmbio real de equilíbrio de longo prazo não é constante, mas varia ao longo do tempo. A abordagem que será usada para demonstrar este fato concilia a pesquisa acadêmica preocupada em testar a hipótese da paridade de poder de compra com a pesquisa orientada para a política econômica que procura estimar a taxa de câmbio real de equilíbrio de longo prazo.4 Uma conseqüência desta abordagem é que ela não implica que a não rejeição da hipótese de raiz unitária para a taxa de câmbio real seja equivalente à rejeição da hipótese de paridade do poder de compra, pois a taxa de câmbio real pode ser uma variável não estacionária e co-integrada com a taxa de câmbio real de longo prazo.5 O trabalho está organizado do seguinte modo: a Seção 2 apresenta uma resenha sucinta de alguns modelos largamente usados na literatura de macroeconomia aberta que especificam as variáveis que afetam a taxa de câmbio real de equilíbrio de longo prazo; a Seção 3 calcula o viés do estimador de mínimos quadrados ordinário da regressão (1) quando a taxa de câmbio real de equilíbrio de longo prazo não é constante; a Seção 4 analisa várias hipóteses quanto ao processo estocástico da taxa de câmbio real de equilíbrio de longo prazo e deduz o processo correspondente à taxa de câmbio real de curto prazo; a Seção 5 conclui o trabalho.

Trade or investment? location decisions under regional integration

This paper studies the production and trade patterns that may arise between two different countries if plant location is introduced as a first step in the producers' decision making. A three-stage game is used: the first deals with location and the next two with capacity and final sales decisions. Demand and cost structures differ by country, and the latter contain specific elements related to the foreign operation. The structure of possible Nash-equilibria is examined and an analysis of the changes in the solution, if the countries engage in an integration process, is made. As in previous models, though global welfare gains may not be very high, single country ones may be considerable, due to changes in the location of the plants. However, even if full integration takes place, global Marshallian welfare may decrease. Conditions which determine a tendency towards multinationalisation are obtained. Assuming a move toward integration, conditions are also provided to characterize when exporting will be preferred to local production. The fact that producers may retain a certain discriminating power, notwithstanding the elimination of barriers to arbitrage, creates a tendency to locate production in the country where prices are higher. This explains why welfare gains may not be obvious. An empirical illustration, with real data from two MERCOSUL countries (Brazil and Argentina) illustrates the possible outcomes.

Globalization and the Industrial Revolution (revised)

This paper argues that trade specialization played an indispensable role in supporting the Industrial Revolution. We calibrate a two-good and two-sector overlapping generations model to Englandís historical development and investigate how much different Englandís development path would have been if it had not globalized in 1840. The open-economy model is able to closely match the data, but the closed-economy model cannot explain the fall in the value of land relative to wages observed in the 19th century. Without globalization, the transition period in the British economy would be considerably longer than that observed in the data and key variables, such as the share of labor force in agriculture, would have converged to Ögures very distant from the actual ones.

Firms?: heterogeneity, organizations, power and trade

This paper develops a theory which investigates the two-way relationship between the internaI organization of the firm and market competition.We introduce heterogenous firms with internal hierarchies in a Knlgman (1980) monopolistic competition model of trade. The model simultanously determines firms' organizational choices anel heterogeneity across firms in size and proeluctivity.Ve show that intenlational trade, market size and the toughness of competition in international markets incluce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to a reorganization of firms towards more decentralized corporate hierarchies.We show further that trade triggers produetivity growth through inter-firm reallocations towards more produetive firms in whieh CEOs have power in firms. At the same time, however trade- induced organizational changes towards fiattened corporate hierarchies lead to a softening of lnternat.ional competition which may contribute a eountervailing negative effect on seetoral productivity.

R&D investment, international trade, and home market and competitiveness efects

We analyze the effects of R&D investment on international trade. The importance of studying this comes from the fact that one of the most important characteristics of modern industrial organization is that firms try to influence market behavior through strategic variables as R&D. Moreover international competition between firms is, more and more, also centered in R&D competition (besides output and price competition). With this in mind, we develop an oligopolist reciprocal-markets model where firms engage in R&D investment to achieve future reductions in marginal costs. We find ‘home market effects’ at the level of R&D investment, i.e.: firms located in countries that host a higher share of skilled-labor perform higher levels of R&D investment. As consequence, firms in these countries are more competitive than firms in other countries, and as such they can penetrate more easily foreign markets. As result of this ‘competitiveness effect’, countries where these firms are located run trade surplus, while countries where firms perform lower levels of R&D investment incur in trade deficits.