The market strategies alternatives of an e-business start-up in Brazil

The e-business market is one of the fastest growing markets in Brazil, with e-business sales accounting for BRL 14.8 billion in 2010 and a growth of 40% per year (+1000% over the past 7 years). Sales-event clubs and collective bargaining websites are one of the most dynamic segments of the e-business market: the number of new players is increasing rapidly, with over 1200 collective bargaining websites currently operating in Brazil. In that context, growth and differentiation seem to be two key success factors for Coquelux. According to webshopper (23rd Edition, e-bit), growth can be achieved by targeting middle and low-income consumers from class C, who represent 50% of the total e-commerce sales. But Coquelux, which is specialized in desire and luxury brands, has built its reputation and competitive advantage through its “exclusivity”, by targeting wealthier consumers from classes A and B who are attracted by its fashionable and high-end positioning. The evolution (growth?) of this market and the development of its competition naturally raise a strategic question for Coquelux’s managers: can Coquelux grow and still maintain its competitive advantage? Should it grow by expanding its consumer base to class C? If so, how? Consumers from classes A, B or C must be targeted through the same online communication channels. Recent studies from the ABEP/ABIPEME emphasized the importance of social networks as a tool for converting new clients and gaining their loyalty, regardless of their social class. However, high-income and low-income e-consumers do not have the same consumption habits, do not respond to the same type of marketing strategies, and most importantly, do not share the same values. Thus, it seems difficult to expand Coquelux’s consumer base to class C without changing its marketing strategies and altering its image Three options were identified for Coquelux: reinforcing its leadership on the luxury segment and focusing on a small niche market (1), which would threaten its survival in the long run; completely changing its strategy and competing for a mass market through commercial brands (2), which requires major financial investments that managers don’t have access to; or finding an intermediary solution (3). This thesis’ recommendation for the third option consists in focusing on premium brands (rather than luxury) in order to increase sales volume (Coquelux’s most profitable sales happened with local desire brands) with products that appeal to class B but also attract the emerging class C which is looking for brand recognition. It could thus implement a slow entry strategy towards the mass market without damaging its main competitive advantage.

Income and bargaining effects on education and health

In this paper, we examine the impacts of the reform in the rural pension system in Brazil in 1991 on schooling and health indicators. In addition, we use the reform to investigate the validity of the unitary model of household allocation by testing if there were uneven impacts on those indicators depending on the gender of the recipient. The main conclusion of the paper is that the reform had significantly positive effects on the outcomes of interest, especially on those co-residing with a male pensioner, indicating that the unitary model is not a well-specified framework to understand family allocation decisions. The highest impacts were on school attendance for boys, literacy for girls and illness for middle-age people. We explore a collective model as defined by Chiappori (1992) as one possible alternative representation for the decision-making process of the poor rural Brazilian families. In the cooperative Nash equilibrium, the reform effects can be divided into two pieces: a direct income effect and bargaining power effect. The data support the existence of these two different effects

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach to collective households

Esta dissertação apresenta uma abordagem alternativa para o problema de taxação de famílias. Mais especificamente modelamos a decisão familiar com um modelo de barganha de Nash em que os o governo determina de forma ótima as utilidades de discórdia. Demonstramos um Princípio da Revelação para esse modelo de forma a reduzir a classe de mecanismos possíveis, além disso calculamos os ganhos do mecanismo ótimo em relação a outros mecanismos razoáveis por meio de exemplos. Discutimos algumas implicações associadas ao mecanismo ótimo.

Risk sharing and the household collective model

When the joint assumption of optimal risk sharing and coincidence of beliefs is added to the collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998) income pooling and symmetry of the pseudo-Hicksian matrix are shown to be restored. Because these are also the features of the unitary model usually rejected in empirical studies one may argue that these assumptions are at odds with evidence. We argue that this needs not be the case. The use of cross-section data to generate price and income variation is based Oil a definition of income pooling or symmetry suitable for testing the unitary model, but not the collective model with risk sharing. AIso, by relaxing assumptions on beliefs, we show that symmetry and income pooling is lost. However, with usual assumptions on existence of assignable goods, we show that beliefs are identifiable. More importantly, if di:fferences in beliefs are not too extreme, the risk sharing hypothesis is still testable.

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.

Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms

Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: "Tax Filing Choices for the Household", "Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches" e "Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms".

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households

Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.