Effects on school enrollment and performance of a conditional transfers program in Mexico

We study the effects of a conditional transfers program on school enrollment and performance in Mexico. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the dynamic educational decision and process inc1uding the endogeneity and uncertainty of performance (passing grades) and the effect of a conditional cash transfer program for children enrolled at school. Careful identification of the program impact on this model is studied. This framework is used to study the Mexican social program Progresa in which a randomized experiment has been implemented and allows us to identify the effect of the conditional cash transfer program on enrollment and performance at school. Using the mIes of the conditional program, we can explain the different incentive effects provided. We also derive the formal identifying assumptions needed to provide consistent estimates of the average treatment effects on enrollment and performance at school. We estimate empirically these effects and find that Progresa had always a positive impact on school continuation whereas for performance it had a positive impact at primary school but a negative one at secondary school, a possible consequence of disincentives due to the program termination after the third year of secondary school.

The effects of a centralized college admission mechanism on migration and college enrollment: evidence from Brazil

No Brasil, a recente reformulação do Exame Nacional de Ensino Médio (ENEM) e a criação do Sistema de Seleção Unificada (SISU), um mecanismo de admissão centralizado que aloca os alunos às instituições, promoveram mudanças relevantes no Ensino Superior. Neste artigo, investigamos os efeitos da introdução do SISU na migração e evasão dos alunos ingressantes a partir dos dados do Censo de Educação Superior. Para tal, exploramos a variação temporal na adesão das instituições ao SISU e encontramos que a adoção do SISU está associada a um aumento da mobilidade entre municípios e entre estados dos alunos ingressantes em 3.8 pontos percentuais (p.p) e 1.6 p.p., respectivamente. Além disso, encontramos um aumento da evasão em 4.5 p.p. Nossos resultados indicam que custos associados à migração e comportamento estratégico são importantes determinantes da evasão dos alunos.

The long-term effects of conditional cash transfers on child labor and school enrollment

This paper investigates the long-term e ects of conditional cash transfers on school attainment and child labor. To this end, we construct a dynamic heterogeneous agent model, calibrate it with Brazilian data, and introduce a policy similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Fam lia. Our results suggest that this type of policy has a very strong impact on educational outcomes, sharply increasing primary school completion. The conditional transfer is also able to reduce the share of working children from 22% to 17%. We then compute the transition to the new steady state and show that the program actually increases child labor over the short run, because the transfer is not enough to completely cover the schooling costs, so children have to work to be able to comply with the program's schooling eligibility requirement. We also evaluate the impacts on poverty, inequality, and welfare.

The long term effects of Bolsa Família on child labour and school enrollment

Neste trabalho, estudamos os impactos de transfer^encias condicionais de renda sobre o trabalho e a educa c~ao infantis. Para tanto, desenvolvemos modelo din^amico de equil brio geral com agentes heterog^eneos, onde as fam lias enfrentam tradeo s com rela c~ao a aloca c~ao de tempo das crian cas em atividades de lazer, em escolaridade e em trabalhar. O modelo e calibrado usando dados da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra em Domic lios, de modo que podemos quanti car os efeitos de uma pol tica de transfer^encia de renda. Finalmente, avaliamos o impacto de um pol tica semelhante ao atual Bolsa Fam lia. Nossos resultados sugerem que o programa, no longo prazo, e capaz de induzir um aumento substancial na escolaridade, al em de ser efetivo na redu c~ao do trabalho infantil e da pobreza. Al em disso, mostramos que um programa progressivo de transfer^encia condicional de renda resulta em benef cios ainda maiores.