Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

Aversão à perda, assimetria nos co-movimentos de mercado e viés doméstico: caso Japão e Reino Unido

Analogamente à Amonlirdviman e Carvalho (2009), que calibrou o modelo de Aversão à Perda Míope de Benartzi and Thaler (1995) para o caso dos Estados Unidos, esta dissertação analisa o problema de alocação de portfolio de ações para o investidor japonês/britânico avesso à perda que decide entre ações domésticas e estrangeiras sujeito às assimetrias nos co-movimentos dos retornos a fim de investigar o papel desta preferência e da evidência empírica de assimetria como potenciais explicações para o viés doméstico em ações. Ao calibrar o modelo para o investidor japonês e britânico, esta dissertação realiza um teste de robustez para o trabalho de Amonlirdviman and Carvalho (2009). Os resultados de inferência dos ganhos com a diversificação internacional apontam que pelo menos parte do viés doméstico existente no caso do Japão e do Reino Unido pode ser explicado pela introdução de preferências com aversão à perda e pela assimetria nos co-movimentos dos retornos.