The drivers for entry and expansion modes of U.S.- based MNES in Brazil

The drivers for entry and expansion modes of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been studied by several authors over the last decades but empirical results have been historically mixed. More recently, Hennart (2009) argued that the reason for the inconsistent results to date resided in the fact that prior theories assumed that local markets could be freely accessed based on a unilateral decision by the MNEs, and then proposes an alternative framework in which the entry and expansion modes of MNEs in foreign countries are a solution based on the relative efficiency of both markets. In this study, the proposed framework is tested against the prior theories based on investments made by U.S.-based MNEs in Brazil from 2005 to 2010. The results suggest that the local market characteristics, more specifically the concentration ratio at the firm and asset levels, are indeed important to influence the entry and expansion mode of U.S.-based MNEs in Brazil, reinforcing the argument against MNEs-centric theories. However, differently from Hennart’s proposition, we were not able to confirm the hypotheses that the MNEs skills are relevant to influence the final solution. We have also tested whether the difference in growth rate between the two countries could be a driver for MNEs to favor acquisition over greenfield given the opportunity cost of postponing the investments. The test result, based on our sample, was not able to confirm this hypothesis.

Oil price shocks and policy implications the emergence of U.S. tight oil production: a case study

How have shocks to supply and demand affected global oil prices; and what are key policy implications following the resurgence of oil production in the United States? Highlights: − The recent collapse in global oil prices was dominated by oversupply. − The future of tight oil in the United States is vulnerable to obstacles beyond oil prices. − Opinions on tight oil from the Top 25 think tank organizations are considered. Global oil prices have fallen more than fifty percent since mid-2014. While price corrections in the global oil markets resulted from multiple factors over the past twelve months, surging tight oil production from the United States was a key driver. Tight oil is considered an unconventional or transitional oil source due to its location in oil-bearing shale instead of conventional oil reservoirs. These qualities make tight oil production fundamentally different from regular crude, posing unique challenges. This case study examines these challenges and explores how shocks to supply and demand affect global oil prices while identifying important policy considerations. Analysis of existing evidence is supported by expert opinions from more than one hundred scholars from top-tier think tank organizations. Finally, implications for United States tight oil production as well as global ramifications of a new low price environment are explored.

Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about

This paper examines the current global scene of distributional disparities within-nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world’s population now live in regions whose median country has a Gini not far from 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the ‘upwards’ side of the ‘Inverted-U’ between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the statistical support there was for the hypothesis that posits that, for whatever reason, ‘things have to get worse before they can get better’). Third, among middle-income countries Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is ‘centrifugal’, and leads to an increased diversity in the shares appropriated by the top 10 and bottom 40 per cent. The other is ‘centripetal’, and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world’s population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes; the other half, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, Globalisation is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich — because the rest ‘follows’ (middle classes able to defend their shares, and workers with ever more precarious jobs in ever more ‘flexible’ labour markets). Therefore, anybody attempting to understand the within-nations disparity of inequality should always be reminded of this basic distributional fact following the example of Clinton’s campaign strategist: by sticking a note on their notice-boards saying “It’s the share of the rich, stupid”.