Gender stereotypes in politics: what changes when a woman becomes the local political leader?

This study documents how the presence of a woman in an executive political role affects the gender stereotype of women in politics. We use Brazilian electoral data and restrict our focus to close mayoral races (using an RDD design) in which the top two candidates are of opposite sexes. Our most important result was a reduction in the number of candidates and votes for female mayoral candidates after a woman is elected, regardless of her eligibility status for reelection. This negative result is linked only to the position of mayor and not to other political positions (councilor, state or federal deputy). In addition, our results may be interpreted as evidence that voters do not use their update on women as local leaders to change their beliefs on women’s ability to run for other political positions. Finally, female mayors do not appear to have a role model effect on younger cohorts of women. We also note that our results are not influenced by differences in mayoral policies (generally and specifically for women), which could influence voters’ gender stereotypes.

Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.

Nature's choice? a study of the displacement of incumbents in elections

Como choques econômicos afetam eleições em democracias? Usando dados eleitorais do Congresso dos Estados Unidos, eu testo se choques adversos podem afetar desigualmente partidos incumbentes e oponentes. Esse efeito é identificado, entre vários procedimentos, por uma regressão em descontinuidade. Eu considero possibilidades teóricas para esse efeito, quando cidadãos não conseguem observar perfeitamente se a falta de bens públicos é devido a um choque adverso, ou a consumo privado do político. Quando o choque é observável, não há efeito; enquanto se não fosse, haveria. As evidências empíricas são consistentes com a teoria.

Election over, battle for Brazil rages

Last week I sat down with a Brazilian acquaintance who was shaking his head over the state of national politics. A graduate of a military high school, he'd been getting e-mails from former classmates, many of them now retired army officers, who were irate over the recent presidential elections. "We need to kick these no-good Petistas out of office," one bristled, using the derogatory shorthand for members of the ruling Workers Party, or PT in Portuguese.

Brazil's election: as polarized as can be

What you see above is a graphic representation of something anyone who followed the campaign that led to the re-election of Dilma Rousseff as Brazil’s president on October 26 already knows: the election was the most polarised in the country’s history. Brasil was split down the middle, not only numerically (Dilma got 52 per cent, Aécio Neves 48) and geographically (Dilma won in the less developed north, Aécio in the more prosperous south). The twitterspere, too, was divided into two camps. Not only that; they hardly talked to each other at all.

Brazil’s 2014 presidential elections: the interconnection between election news and stock market behavior

This study researches whether there has been abnormal stock market behaviour in Brazil as a consequence of election news (observed via opinion polls), regarding the last Brazilian presidential election, held in October 2014. Via applying event study methodology, the research on the Ibovespa and Petrobras suggests that events in which Rousseff was gaining in share have been subject to negative abnormal returns, and events where Rousseff was loosing in share have led to positive abnormal returns. Moreover, volatility has been significantly elevated during the election period and volume has been found to have slightly increased.

Pricing the cost of an election: the impact of the 2014 elections on stock markets

Qual o efeito de eleições em ativos reais? É possível mensurar diretamente a diferença de preços mesmo que só possamos enxergar um dos resultados potenciais? Essa dissertação estima esses efeitos utilizando metodologia baseada em opções sobre ações. O modelo aqui desenvolvido adaptção tradicional Black-Scholes para incorporar dois novos parâmetros: um salto no preço do ativo perfeitamente antecipado e uma série de probabilidades diárias refletindo as crenças sobre quem venceria a corrida eleitoral. Aplicamos esse método para o caso brasileiro das Eleições Presidenciais de 2014 e a Petrobras - uma importante companhia do setor petrolífero do país -utilizando dados de bolsa do segundo turno das eleições. Os resultados encontrados mostram uma diferença de 65-77% para o valor da companhia, dependendo de quem vencesse nas urnas. Isso é equivalente a aproximadamente 2.5% do PIB de 2014 do país.