Empirical essays on IPOS: the Brazilian case

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the main factors that determine the first-day return and the Flipping activity in Brazilian IPOs, taking into account expected results according to national and international researches. The data base encompasses IPOs that took place between May 2004 and February 2011, summing up to 129 IPOs and approximately R$ 128 billion offering. The first-day return, which means the “money left on the table”, was on average 4.6% taking into consideration the issue price, while the Flipping activity totalized R$ 7.2 billion, meaning 5.6% of the offering. The first-day return was analyzed before and after the first trade, and evidences were found supporting (a) the exogenous determination of the issue price, (b) the opening price dependence of prospectus disclosure and of other variables, observable previously to the bookbuilding process, and (c) the cascade behavior of investors in the pricing after the first trade, particularly driven by the underwriter behavior. In regards to the Flipping, it was notorious depending on how much the IPO succeeded, being concentrated in and homogeneous along the first-day, despite the intense negotiation in the first minute. As a general contribution to literature, it was concluded that Information Asymmetry Theory arguments are not sufficient to explain the first-day Underpricing and the Flipping, being necessary arguments based on Behavioral Finance adapted to an intraday perspective.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.

Entry and externality : hydroelectric generators in Brazil

This work analyzes the entry problem in the hydroelectric generation industry. The operation of a generator upstream regularizes the river flow for generators located downstream on the same river, increasing the production capacity of the latter. This positive externality increases the attractiveness of the locations downstream whenever a generator decides to enter upstream. Therefore, the entry decision of a generator in a given location may affect all entry decisions in potential locations for plants downstream. I first model the problem of generators located in cascade on the same river to show the positive effect of the externality. Next, I develop a method to estimate an entry model specific to the hydro generation industry which takes into account the externality of the entry decisions. Finally, I use a data set on investment decisions of Brazilian hydro-generators to estimate the model. The results show a positive incentive to locate downstream from existing plants and from locations where entry is likely to occur. An interesting by-product of the analysis is that the year effects’ estimates show an increase one year before the energy crisis of 2001, providing evidence that the market anticipated the crisis. It contradicts the governmental version that the crisis was due to an unexpected drought.