The life-cycle effects of social security in a model with housing and endogenous benefits

This article develops a life-cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents who make choices of nondurables consumption, investment in homeowned housing and labour supply. Agents retire from an specific age and receive Social Security benefits which are dependant on average past earnings. The model is calibrated, numerically solved and is able to match stylized U.S. aggregate statistics and to generate average life-cycle profiles of its decision variables consistent with data and literature. We also conduct an exercise of complete elimination of the Social Security system and compare its results with the benchmark economy. The results enable us to emphasize the importance of endogenous labour supply and benefits for agents' consumption-smoothing behaviour.

Monopolies life cycle, bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian growth

This paper analyzes the links between the internaI organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internaI collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, getting more bureaucratized and Iess efficient over time. vVeak creative destruction in the economy facilitates informal collusion inside firms and exacerbates bureaucratization. As bureaucratization affects the firms' profitability and the return to innovation, stationary equilibrium growth depends in turn on the efficiency of collusive side-contracts within firms.

Life Cycle Models, Heterogeneity of Initial Assets,and Wealth Inequality

Life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this article, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data - and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets, which is estimated using a non-parametric method applied to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets.

Assets, markets and poverty in Brazil

Esse artigo estabelece uma base para pesquisas que tratam da relação entre pobreza, distribuição de recursos e operação do mercado de capitais no Brasil. O principal objetivo é auxiliar a implementação de políticas de reforço de capital dos pobres. A disponibilidade de novas fontes de dados abriu condições inéditas para implementar uma análise de posse de ativos e pobreza nas áreas metropolitanas brasileiras. A avaliação de distribuição de recursos foi estruturada sobre três itens: Capital físico, capital humano e capital social. A estratégia empírica seguida é de analisar três diferentes tipos de impactos que o aumento dos ativos dos pobres podem exercer no nível de bem estar social. A primeira parte do artigo avalia a posse de diferentes tipos de capitais através da distribuição de renda. Esse exercício pode ser encarado como uma ampliação de medidas de pobreza baseadas em renda pela incorporação de efeitos diretos exercidos pela posse de ativos no bem estar social. A segunda parte do artigo descreve o impacto de geração de renda que a posse de ativos pode ter sobre os pobres. Estudamos como a acumulação de diferentes tipos de capital impactam os índices de pobreza baseados na renda usando regressões logísticas. A terceira parte estuda o efeito que o aumento da posse de ativos dos pobres tem no melhoramento da habilidade dos indivíduos pobres em lidar com choques adversos da renda. Estudamos a interação entre a dinâmica da renda, imperfeições do mercado de capitais e comportamentos financeiros levando em consideração diferentes horizontes de tempo. As questões de longo prazo estão relacionadas com o estudo das flutuações de renda de baixa freqüência e ciclo da vida da posse de ativos usando análise de coorte. As questões de curto prazo estão relacionadas com o comportamento do pobre e as perdas de bem estar ao lidar com hiatos de alta freqüência entre renda e consumo desejado. A análise da dinâmica de renda e pobreza é conduzida a partir da combinação de dados de painel de renda com dados qualitativos sobre comportamento financeiro de curto prazo das famílias.

A monthly indicator of Brazilian GDP. The Brazilian business cycle and growth cycle

This paper constructs an indicator of Brazilian GDP at the monthly ftequency. The peculiar instability and abrupt changes of regimes in the dynamic behavior of the Brazilian business cycle were explicitly modeled within nonlinear ftameworks. In particular, a Markov switching dynarnic factor model was used to combine several macroeconomic variables that display simultaneous comovements with aggregate economic activity. The model generates as output a monthly indicator of the Brazilian GDP and real time probabilities of the current phase of the Brazilian business cycle. The monthly indicator shows a remarkable historical conformity with cyclical movements of GDP. In addition, the estimated filtered probabilities predict ali recessions in sample and out-of-sample. The ability of the indicator in linear forecasting growth rates of GDP is also examined. The estimated indicator displays a better in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance in forecasting growth rates of real GDP, compared to a linear autoregressive model for GDP. These results suggest that the estimated monthly indicator can be used to forecast GDP and to monitor the state of the Brazilian economy in real time.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.