5 resultados para Bull riding
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
O objetivo dessa pesquisa é o estudo dos processos de formação e desenvolvimento da identidade social no trabalho e a análise crítica da mudança organizacional vivida pelo Bull França, empresa de informática em crise. Tentando reduzir a diversidade cultural através da implantação de um novo sistema de recursos humanos, esta emrpesa enfrentou uma forte resistência organizacional. Tentaremos retirar lições dessa experiência
Resumo:
We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.
Resumo:
Este documento relata os resultados de pesquisa que objetivou testar se o investimento de longo prazo em ações no Brasil propicia a obtenção de maiores retornos e menores riscos, conforme sugerido por recomendações da imprensa financeira brasileira. Foram estudados os retornos mensais do Ibovespa, excedentes em relação à caderneta de poupança, no período de janeiro de 1969 a dezembro de 1998, contra vários horizontes de investimento. A evidência empírica constatada indica que "sabedoria convencional" tem algum suporte no que se refere a que o risco se reduz à medida que aumenta o horizonte do investimento, mas que o retorno não aumenta com o horizonte do investimento. No geral, os resultados não parecem ser sensíveis à consideração de que os investimentos se encerram em período de baixa ou de alta do mercado.
Resumo:
We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.
Resumo:
We estimate the impact of the main unconditional federal grant (Fundo de Participaçãodos Municípios - FPM) to Brazilian municipalities as well as its spillover from the neighboring cities on local health outcomes. We consider data from 2002 to 2007 (Brollo et al, 2013) and explore the FPM distribution rule according to population brackets to apply a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) using cities near the thresholds. In elasticity terms, we nd a reduction on infant mortality rate (-0.18) and on morbidity rate (- 0.41), except in the largest cities of our sample. We also nd an increase on the access to the main program of visiting the vulnerable families, the Family Health Program (Programa Sa ude da Família - PSF). The e ects are stronger for the smallest cities of our sample and we nd increase: (i) On the percentage of residents enrolled in the program (0.36), (ii) On the per capita number of PSF visits (1.59), and (iii) On the per capita number of PSF visits with a doctor (1.8) and nurse (2). After we control for the FPM spillover using neighboring cities near diferent thresholds, our results show that the reduction in morbidity and mortality is largely due to the spillover e ect, but there are negative spillover on preventive actions, as PSF doctors visits and vaccination. Finally, the negative spillover e ect on health resources may be due free riding or political coordination problems, as in the case of the number of hospital beds, but also due to to competition for health professionals, as in the case of number of doctors (-0.35 and -0.87, respectively), specially general practitioners and surgeons (-1.84 and -2.45).