Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.

Empresários brasileiros em Cambridge e East Boston

Este trabalho tem como objeto de estudo as pequenas empresas criadas pelos brasileiros que emigraram para Boston a partir de meados da década de 80. Foi feito um levantamento e uma caracterização sócioeconomica tanto das firmas como de seus proprietários. A pesquisa incorporou ainda dois outros aspectos: a articulação local em torno da criação de uma Câmara de Comércio Exterior em Boston e as classificações sobre raça e etnicidade dos proprietários.

Empresários brasileiros em Boston

O trabalho teve como objeto de estudo as pequenas empresas criadas pelos brasileiros que emigraram para Boston a partir de meados da década de 80. Foi feito um levantamento e uma caracterização das firmas, assim como de seus proprietários. Entretanto, o foco da análise incorporou outras dimensões, e não apenas aquelas de caráter econômico/empresarial. Ou seja, também foi analisada a dimensão sócio-cultural do papel desempenhado por estas empresas e que, do ponto de vista conceitual, caracteriza a chamada "economia étnica" organizada pelos grupos imigrantes daquele país.

Analysis of two-party salary negotiations: factos impeding a mutually-beneficial joint agreement

Business professionals were surveyed to explore both factors associated with negotiation propensity, as well as the strategies used by employees and employers in salary negotiations. The objective is to examine the factors that impede both pasties in reaching a mutually-beneficial joint agreement in salary negotiations. In order to achieve this objective, a review of the negotiations literature was conducted including both. Descriptive literature - present research finding and scientific theory which characterizes negotiation and examines the forces that determine it's course and outcome - as well as a review of the prescriptive literature - in order to develop practical advice given a description of hw negotiators behave. Research result show that, although there is general tendency for employers to leave room in the first offer for negotiation, employees rarely ask for more and generally accept the first offer. The sub-optimal outcome was partially a result of the employees' preferred strategies for negotiation salary: a soft approach focusing on compromised and maintaining the relationship. An analysis of the results combined with the literature explore, demonstrates that both parties exhibited a fixed-pie perspective, focusing on salary as the key issue, which impeded the search for integrative settlements and, mutually beneficial trade-offs.

Innovation districts: an investigation of the replication of the 22@ Barcelona’s Model in Boston

In 2000, the city of Barcelona launched 22@ Barcelona, dubbed the innovation district. The city sees the project as a means to accelerate Barcelona’s transition toward the knowledge economy. Other cities around the world have since followed the example of Barcelona, building or planning to build their own innovation districts. Boston began to establish its innovation district in 2010. Cities’ ultimate goal for these initiatives is to become more innovative and thus more competitive. Innovative districts are different from technology parks in that they aim to respond to a new economic paradigm in which economic production flows back to cities. The 22@ Barcelona model involves theoretical designs regarding five layers of innovation: economics, urban planning, productive, innovative, and creative. The comparative approach between 22@ Barcelona and Boston’s Innovation District intends to highlight the similarities and differences between those two innovation districts as well as providing a framework to define innovation districts.

Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems

In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.