O computador na escola: um exame de uma prática

Este estudo objetivou contribuir para um melhor entendimento do processo de informatização em nossas escolas, enfatizando uma vertente ainda pouco explorada pelos pesquisadores: as possíveis mudanças organizacionais decorrentes da utilização do microcomputador. Esta temática foi introduzida, nesta dissertação, a partir da contextualização de algumas das inúmeras dimensões pedagógicas, históricas, econômicas, políticas e sociais, que entremeadas, formam o intrincado tecido da informatização da educação. Para seu desenvolvimento, tornou-se necessário adaptar-se a proposta de Robert Shirley (1976) para o exame de mudanças organizacionais e utilizou-se de algumas categorias de análise sugeridas por Sheingold e outras (1983). Realizou-se uma pesquisa, em estabelecimento educacional localizado na zona oeste da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, que pode ser classificada como um estudo de caso de caráter exploratório. Nesta pesquisa foram empregadas a observação não participante, entrevistas padronizadas e não padronizadas, questionários e análise documental. Em relação às estratégias de mudança, não se constatou o aparecimento dos novos papéis, a preparação formal dos professores não atingiu a maior parte do corpo docente e o acesso aos microcomputadores, restrito aos alunos do primeiro segmento do 12 grau, viu-se bastante limitado. Os sistemas de coordenação revelaram-se bastante centralizados e a distribuição de pOder mostrou-se hierarquizada, com forte submissão à autoridade da família proprietária. Diante de tal quadro, a participação dos professores, apesar de solicitada pela coordenação de informática, era na verdade imposta pela direção. O software adotado pela instituição foi o LOGO, utilizado ao lado da análise do discurso da criança. A síntese dos resultados evidenciou o crescente processo de mercantilização do ensino em nosso país e do uso da informática como um novo atrativo para a matrícula de novos alunos. Como conseqOência disto, surge a necessidade de novos estudos para se confirmar a relevância pedagógica da informatização do ensino ou para constatar-se, em escolas preocupadas apenas com o faturamento, sua importância comercial.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

The relationship between board of director's nationality diversity and financial performance

Companies are moving to a more international structure; going into new markets and having an increased competition in all fronts. Therefore, the practices that lead companies to a more efficient and competitive position are praised. The management of the workforce comes as one of the main concerns of companies, aiming at performance enhancing and at creating better environments that both attract and maintain the professional talents. In an increasingly international environment, companies tend to look for the specialists and best professionals, regardless of their nationality. This new structure with several different nationalities working together poses new challenges for companies. Understanding if and how a more diverse has a relationship with financial performance is the starting point for better managing this new corporate structure.

Two heads may not be better than one : corporate board structure, managerial self-dealing,and common agency

This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which the CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two Boards, each responsible for a different task. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. A consequence of the first feature is that the CEO always exerts less effort toward production with a dual board. The effect of a dual board on CEO self-dealing is ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the higher monitoring, self-dealing is higher in a dual system. The model indicates that the strategic interdependence generated by the assignment of different tasks to different boards may yield results that are far from the desired ones.