Two heads may not be better than one : corporate board structure, managerial self-dealing,and common agency

This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which the CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two Boards, each responsible for a different task. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. A consequence of the first feature is that the CEO always exerts less effort toward production with a dual board. The effect of a dual board on CEO self-dealing is ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the higher monitoring, self-dealing is higher in a dual system. The model indicates that the strategic interdependence generated by the assignment of different tasks to different boards may yield results that are far from the desired ones.

The LDC debt problem: a game-theoretical analisys

We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

Antecedentes da participação das empresas no financiamento político: um estudo com dados gerados por meio de dinâmica de simulação empresarial (Business game)

Abordagens teóricas dominantes no campo da estratégia empresarial (PORTER, 1980; BARNEY, 1991; PISANO e TEECE, 1997), de modo geral, não consideram explicitamente o comportamento corporativo político como um componente do amplo conjunto de elementos que compõem a estrutura dos processos de formulação e implementação estratégica. A pouca ênfase dada ao papel das firmas na seara política resulta em limitações para compreensão do ambiente competitivo e, consequentemente reduz o poder explicativo de estudos que se propõem a desvendar as razões do desempenho diferenciado das organizações. Salorio, Boddewyn e Dahan (2005) reforçam tal perspectiva ao observarem que firmas são organizações econômicas na medida em que em suas transações ponderam custos, benefícios, lucros, market share, mas também, enquanto organizações precisam definir e gerenciar fronteiras, bem como diferenciar e integrar seus membros, os stakerolders e suas operações. Esse envolvimento em um mix de comportamento político-econômico de barganha e não barganha leva à definição das firmas também como organizações políticas. Apesar de tal linha de pensamento ainda ter conotação de novidade para alguns, de reciclagem de antigas ideias para outros, ou, mesmo, parecer se pautar pela tentativa de retomar questões que sempre foram tratadas de forma lateral, Salorio, Boddewyn e Dahan (2005) enfatizam que “the political is always there”. O presente projeto teve objetivo central modelar ambiente simulado para testar antecedentes da atividade política corporativa (HILLMAN, KEIM e SCHULER, 2004), e como objetivos específicos: Modelar um simulador dos ambientes de negócio e político das empresas; aplicar o simulador para gerar dados sobre os antecedentes da participação política; testar antecedentes da participação política como alternativa estratégica em resposta ao baixo desempenho das firmas, a disponibilidade de recursos e a atividade política de concorrentes; testar a interação entre antecedentes de market e nonmarket para explicar a participação política. Com relação aos objetivos, o estudo pode ser caracterizado como explicativo, e quanto aos procedimentos técnicos adotados como de laboratório. O tipo de pesquisa adotado foi o de verificação de hipóteses causais assentada em uma abordagem metodológica quantitativa, cujos dados foram coletados por meio de 12 simulações, estruturadas no formato de um business game, com nove empresas em cada simulação, totalizando 108 unidades de análise. Configuram-se como sujeitos da pesquisa alunos do último ano dos cursos de graduação em administração e economia da Universidade Estadual de Londrina. As análises dos dados foram efetuadas utilizando-se o software STATA para desenvolvimento das regressões, sendo considerado como modelo estatístico a técnica de dados em painel com efeito fixo (WOOLDRIDGE, 2003), visto que o foco do estudo é a análise das informações (decisões/desempenho) das empresas ao longo do tempo. Os resultados indicam que: a) a ineficiência da firma afeta positivamente o investimento em financiamento eleitoral; b) o investimento em ações políticas corporativas ocorre no sentido de complementação às ações de market e não em contraposição, c) a maior propensão em investir em nonmarket está relacionada com desempenho inferior ao da concorrência; d) o aumento do investimento em nonmarket não está relacionado com a ação política mais ativa por parte da concorrência. Não foram encontradas evidências de que firmas com maiores sobras de recursos são mais ativas politicamente.

Investigando a aplicação da realidade virtual na educação: vídeo game

A evolução constante da tecnologia está impulsionando a educação para novos rumos, enfatizando a utilização de novas ferramentas, propiciando uma evolução no processo de ensino/aprendizagem. A Realidade Virtual terá e já está tendo um papel definitivo nessa evolução. A presente dissertação visa contribuir para o entendimento das percepções dos estudantes da cidade de Curitiba sobre o uso dos computadores na educação. Para investigar e interpretar tais percepções foram consideradas as principais características das Geração Boomer e Geração Y e os alicerces básicos necessários para a utilização dos conceitos de Realidade Virtual, Educação a Distância, Era Digital, seus efeitos e sua possível aplicação na educação, de modo a permitir que o estudante descubra, explore e construa o seu próprio conhecimento. Buscou-se ainda identificar se as interpretações sobre a tecnologia de Realidade Virtual são convergentes ou divergentes entre os estudantes. Para atingir os objetivos propostos, a coleta de dados se deu a partir da aplicação de questionários estruturados a estudantes do ensino fundamental, médio e superior, matriculados no ano letivo de 2009. A análise dos dados revelou haver uma convergência unânime entre as respostas dos entrevistados e os objetivos da pesquisa.

The relationship between board of director's nationality diversity and financial performance

Companies are moving to a more international structure; going into new markets and having an increased competition in all fronts. Therefore, the practices that lead companies to a more efficient and competitive position are praised. The management of the workforce comes as one of the main concerns of companies, aiming at performance enhancing and at creating better environments that both attract and maintain the professional talents. In an increasingly international environment, companies tend to look for the specialists and best professionals, regardless of their nationality. This new structure with several different nationalities working together poses new challenges for companies. Understanding if and how a more diverse has a relationship with financial performance is the starting point for better managing this new corporate structure.

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

Who is the cowboy in Washington?: beating google at their own game with neuroscience and cryptography

Who was the cowboy in Washington? What is the land of sushi? Most people would have answers to these questions readily available,yet, modern search engines, arguably the epitome of technology in finding answers to most questions, are completely unable to do so. It seems that people capture few information items to rapidly converge to a seemingly 'obvious' solution. We will study approaches for this problem, with two additional hard demands that constrain the space of possible theories: the sought model must be both psychologically and neuroscienti cally plausible. Building on top of the mathematical model of memory called Sparse Distributed Memory, we will see how some well-known methods in cryptography can point toward a promising, comprehensive, solution that preserves four crucial properties of human psychology.

Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems

In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.