Incompatibilidade distributiva e desenvolvimento auto-sustentado

Effective macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth will only be achieved in Brazil when the country settles the distributive inconsistency that arose in the 1970s. Since then the state and the nation started to incur respectively in high domestic and foreign debt. Wages grew at much slower rate than productivity, and income concentrated in the hands of business entrepreneurs and particularly of rentiers. Sheer populist practices, or disguised combination of neo-liberal and neopopulist policies were unable to address the problem. Budget deficits and high inflation, or exchange rate overvaluation and financial crises were the typical outcome. To settle distributive inconsistency by compensating in the short term workers for their income losses is not realistic. Only a consistent growth strategy and a credible commitment to share future growth benefits, combined with active social policies oriented to the poor, will do the job.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

Inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions

This article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget. We show that states can use their financiaI institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal govemment. As a result, there is a bias towards Iarge deficits and high inflation rates. Our model also predicts that state owned financiaI institutions should underperform the market, mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non-performing loans to their own shareholders, that is, the states. Brazil and Argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions .

Economic growth with foreign saving?

Highly indebted countries, particularly the Latin American ones, presented dismal economic outcomes in the 1990s, which are the consequence of the ‘growth cum foreign savings strategy’, or the Second Washington Consensus. Coupled with liberalization of international financial flows, such strategy, which did not make part of the first consensus, led the countries, in the wave of a new world wide capital flow cycle, to high current account deficits and increase in foreign debt, ignoring the solvency constraint and the debt threshold. In practical terms it involved overvalued currencies (low exchange rates) and high interest rates; in policy terms, the attempt to control de budget deficit while the current account deficit was ignored. The paradoxical consequence was the adoption by highly indebted countries of ‘exchange rate populism’, a less obvious but more dangerous form of economic populism.

Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

The power of the purse : what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states and tests the capability of congressional, electoral and partisan theories to explain such allocation. We find that socio-economic characteristics are important explanatory variables but are not sufficient to explain the disparities in the distribution of federal monies. First, prestige committee membership is not conducive to pork-barrelling. We do not find any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite, safe states tend to be rewarded. Also, states that are historically "swing" in presidential elections tend to receive more funds. Finally, we find strong evidence supporting partisan theories of budget allocation. States whose governor has the same political affiliation of the President receive more federal funds; while states whose representatives belong to a majority opposing the president party receive less funds.