Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Speculative attacks, openness and crises

In this paper we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate financial adjustments that some emerging market economies went through to overcome external crises during the latest decades, such as default and local currency devaluation. We assume that real devaluation can be used to avoid external debt default, to improve trade balance and to reduce the real public debt level denominated in local currency. Such effects increase the government ability to deal with external crisis, but also have costs in terms of welfare, related to expected inflation, reductions in private investments and higher interest to be paid over the public debt. We conclude that openness improves expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology against crises. We also present results for 32 middle-income countries, verifying that the proposed model can indicate, in a stylized way, the preferences for default-devaluation options and the magnitude of the currency depreciation required to overcome 48 external crises occurred as from 1971. Finally, as we construct our model based on the Cole-Kehoe self-fulfilling debt crisis model ([7]), adding local debt and trade, it is important to say that their policy alternatives to leave the crisis zone remains in our extended model, namely, to reduce the external debt level and to lengthen its maturity.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

The Brazilian real state market in 2012: robust growth or speculative bubble?

A forte alta dos imóveis no Brasil nos últimos anos iniciou um debate sobre a possível existência de uma bolha especulativa. Dada a recente crise do crédito nos Estados Unidos, é factível questionar se a situação atual no Brasil pode ser comparada à crise americana. Considerando argumentos quantitativos e fundamentais, examina-se o contexto imobiliário brasileiro e questiona-se a sustentabilidade em um futuro próximo. Primeiramente, analisou-se a taxa de aluguel e o nível de acesso aos imóveis e também utilizou-se um modelo do custo real para ver se o mercado está em equilíbrio o não. Depois examinou-se alguns fatores fundamentais que afetam o preço dos imóveis – oferta e demanda, crédito e regulação, fatores culturais – para encontrar evidências que justificam o aumento dos preços dos imóveis. A partir dessas observações tentou-se chegar a uma conclusão sobre a evolução dos preços no mercado imobiliário brasileiro. Enquanto os dados sugerem que os preços dos imóveis estão supervalorizados em comparação ao preço dos aluguéis, há evidências de uma legítima demanda por novos imóveis na emergente classe média brasileira. Um risco maior pode estar no mercado de crédito, altamente alavancado em relação ao consumidor brasileiro. No entanto, não se encontrou evidências que sugerem mais do que uma temporária estabilização ou correção no preço dos imóveis.

Asset float and speculative bubbles

We model the relationship between ftoat (the tradeable shares of an asset) and stock price bubbles. Investors trade a stock that initiaUy has a limited ftoat because of insider lock-up restrictions but the tradeable shares of which increase over time as these restrictions expire. A speculative bubble arises because investors, with heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and facing short-sales constraints, anticipate the option to reseU the stock to buyers with even higher valuations. With limited risk absorption capacity, this resale option depends on ftoat as investors anticipate the change in asset supply over time and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Our model yields implications consistent with the behavior of internet stock prices during the late nineties, such as the bubble, share turnover and volatility decreasing with ftoat and stock prices tending to drop on the lock-up expiration date though it is known to aU in advance.

Speculative bubbles and contagion: analysis of volatility’s clusters during the DotCom bubble based on the dynamic conditional correlation model

Revendo a definição e determinação de bolhas especulativas no contexto de contágio, este estudo analisa a bolha do DotCom nos mercados acionistas americanos e europeus usando o modelo de correlação condicional dinâmica (DCC) proposto por Engle e Sheppard (2001) como uma explicação econométrica e, por outro lado, as finanças comportamentais como uma explicação psicológica. Contágio é definido, neste contexto, como a quebra estatística nos DCC’s estimados, medidos através das alterações das suas médias e medianas. Surpreendentemente, o contágio é menor durante bolhas de preços, sendo que o resultado principal indica a presença de contágio entre os diferentes índices dos dois continentes e demonstra a presença de alterações estruturais durante a crise financeira.

Speculative bubbles and contagion: analysis of volatility's clusters during the DotCom bubble based on the dynamic conditional correlation model

Reviewing the de nition and measurement of speculative bubbles in context of contagion, this paper analyses the DotCom bubble in American and European equity markets using the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model proposed by (Engle and Sheppard 2001) as on one hand as an econometrics explanation and on the other hand the behavioral nance as an psychological explanation. Contagion is de ned in this context as the statistical break in the computed DCCs as measured by the shifts in their means and medians. Even it is astonishing, that the contagion is lower during price bubbles, the main nding indicates the presence of contagion in the di¤erent indices among those two continents and proves the presence of structural changes during nancial crisis