Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

"A sala de detidos": atuação e ascenção da polícia política da capital federal do Brasil, 1920-1937

Exploramos neste trabalho o desenvolvimento e a ascensão da função de polícia política da capital federal do Brasil, aqui compreendida como um mecanismo de proteção e manutenção do poder do Estado. Tomando por base as décadas de 1920 e 1930, procuramos investigar duas hipóteses. Primeiro, que nessa primeira década, o exercício de polícia política, a cargo da 4ª. Delegacia Auxiliar, pode ser tomado como o início do aperfeiçoamento da função. Segundo que o decênio seguinte, ao ser marcado em seus primeiros anos por um processo de democratização das instituições brasileiras - que culmina com promulgação da Carta Constitucional de 1934, nos instiga à indagação sobre a necessidade do Estado contar oficialmente, a partir de 1933, com um órgão para o exercício exclusivo da função de polícia política. A análise contempla, a partir da legislação sobre reorganização dos serviços policiais e da repressão social e política, bem como acerca dos documentos produzidos pela polícia política, a relação entre o desenvolvimento desses órgãos e os eventos sociais e políticos no contexto nacional e internacional. Os pressupostos que nortearam o desenvolvimento dos órgãos de polícia política nas décadas enfocadas, sugerem que a relação de exclusividade entre os mesmos e os regimes autoritários deve ser problematizada, ainda que, ao longo da história, grande parte dos governos de matriz autoritária ou totalitária tenha desenvolvido órgãos de polícia política que exerceram um papel proeminente na estrutura de segurança do Estado. Longe, contudo, de esgotar a discussão, buscamos oferecer elementos adicionais para o entendimento sobre a necessidade de o Estado manter uma polícia voltada à produção de informações visando ao acompanhamento de certos eventos sociais e políticos.

Labor legislation and the size of informal sector in Brazil

This paper studies the increase in the rate of informal workers in the Brazilian economy that occurred between 1985 and 1999. We develop an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets in which agents are ex-post heterogeneous. We calibrate it to match some features of the Brazilian economy for 1985. We conduct a policy experiment which reproduces the 1988 constitution reforms that increased the retirement benefits and labor costs in the formal sector. We show that these reforms can explain the increase in informal labor. Then, we conduct a policy experiment and analyze its impact on the Brazilian economy.