10 resultados para Asymmetric bending
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
Our main goal in this paper was to measure how e¢ cient is risk sharing between countries. In order to do so, we have used a international risk sharIn this paper we re-analyze the question of the U.S. public debt sustainability by using a quantile autoregression model. This modeling allows for testing whether the behavior of U.S. public debt is asymmetric or not. Our results provide evidence of a band of sustainability. Outside this band, the U.S. public debt is unsustainable. We also nd scal policy to be adequate in the sense that occasional episodes in which the public debt moves out of the band do not pose a threat to long run sustainability.
Resumo:
Asymmetric kernels are quite useful for the estimation of density functions with bounded support. Gamma kernels are designed to handle density functions whose supports are bounded from one end only, whereas beta kernels are particularly convenient for the estimation of density functions with compact support. These asymmetric kernels are nonnegative and free of boundary bias. Moreover, their shape varies according to the location of the data point, thus also changing the amount of smoothing. This paper applies the central limit theorem for degenerate U-statistics to compute the limiting distribution of a class of asymmetric kernel functionals.
Resumo:
In this paper we re-analyze the question of the U.S. public debt sustainability by using a quantile autoregression model. This modeling allows for testing whether the behavior of U.S. public debt is asymmetric or not. Our results provide evidence of a band of sustainability. Outside this band, the U.S. public debt is unsustainable. We also find fiscal policy to be adequate in the sense that occasional episodes in which the public debt moves out of the band do not pose a threat to long run sustainability.
Resumo:
Radner (1968) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature.
Resumo:
The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.
Resumo:
Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.
Resumo:
This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.
Resumo:
Extant literature examined the benefits of relational embeddedness in facilitating collaboration between organizations, as well as the necessity of firms to balance their knowledge generation into exploration and exploitation activities. However, the effects of relational embeddedness in the specific outputs of firm-university collaborations, as well as the elements that affect the exploratory nature of such outcomes remain underexplored. By examining fine grained data of more than 4.000 collaborative research and development projects by a firm and universities, 5.000 patents, and 300.000 scientific publications, it was proposed that relational embeddedness would have a positive effect on resource commitment and on joint scientific publications, but a negative effect on joint patents and exploratory outcomes resulting of such collaborations. Additionally, it was proposed that knowledge similarity would have a negative impact in exploratory endeavors made in such projects. Although some of the propositions were not supported by the data, this study revealed that relational embeddedness increases resource commitment and the production of joint scientific publications in such partnerships. At last, this study presents interesting opportunities for future research.
Resumo:
The main objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that utility preferences that incorporate asymmetric reactions between gains and losses generate better results than the classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the Brazilian market. The asymmetric behavior can be computed through the introduction of a disappointment (or loss) aversion coefficient in the classical expected utility function, which increases the impact of losses against gains. The results generated by both traditional and loss aversion utility functions are compared with real data from the Brazilian market regarding stock market participation in the investment portfolio of pension funds and individual investors.
Resumo:
We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.