10 resultados para Approximate Bayesian computation
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to analyze extremal events using Generalized Pareto Distributions (GPD), considering explicitly the uncertainty about the threshold. Current practice empirically determines this quantity and proceeds by estimating the GPD parameters based on data beyond it, discarding all the information available be10w the threshold. We introduce a mixture model that combines a parametric form for the center and a GPD for the tail of the distributions and uses all observations for inference about the unknown parameters from both distributions, the threshold inc1uded. Prior distribution for the parameters are indirectly obtained through experts quantiles elicitation. Posterior inference is available through Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Simulations are carried out in order to analyze the performance of our proposed mode1 under a wide range of scenarios. Those scenarios approximate realistic situations found in the literature. We also apply the proposed model to a real dataset, Nasdaq 100, an index of the financiai market that presents many extreme events. Important issues such as predictive analysis and model selection are considered along with possible modeling extensions.
Resumo:
In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .
Resumo:
We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .
Resumo:
Esta tese tem como objetivo principal aproximar a evidencia empirica existente sobre os agregados macroeconomicos com as novas evidencias empiricas baseadas nos micro dados de precos ao consumidor, tendo como base os modelos padroes de rigidez de preco utilizados na literatura de politica monetaria. Para isso, esta tese utiliza a base de dados individuais de precos ao consumidor no Brasil fornecida pela Fundacao Getulio Vargas. Especificamente, esta tese foca em tres temas principais: a existencia de variac˜oes temporararias de precos, a heterogeneidade na rigidez de precos entre firmas de um mesmo setor e o formato das func˜oes hazard. Os resultados mostram que: existe de fato uma correlac˜ao entre as variaveis referentes as mudancas temporararias de precos e os agregados macroeconomicos; a heterogeneidade na rigidez de precos entre firmas de um mesmo setor apresenta efeitos significativos sobre a dinamica dos agregados macroeconomicos; e por fim, o formato mais geral da func˜ao hazard proposta nesta tese possibilita novas dinamicas dos agregados macroeconomicos.
Resumo:
This paper shows existence of approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space in an environment of incomplete markets. We prove that the approximate recursive equilibrium implements an approximate sequential equilibrium which is always close to a Magill and Quinzii equilibrium without short sales for arbitrarily small errors. This implies that the competitive equilibrium can be implemented by using forecast statistics with minimal state space provided that agents will reduce errors in their estimates in the long run. We have also developed an alternative algorithm to compute the approximate recursive equilibrium with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents through a procedure of iterating functional equations and without using the rst order conditions of optimality.
Resumo:
Economias emergentes sofrem importantes restrições de crédito quando comparadas com economias desenvolvidas, entretanto, modelos estocásticos de equilíbrio geral (DSGE) desenhados para economias emergentes ainda precisam avançar nessa discussão. Nós propomos um modelo DSGE que pretende representar uma economia emergente com setor bancário baseado em Gerali et al. (2010). Nossa contribuição é considerar uma parcela da renda esperada como colateral para empréstimos das famílias. Nós estimamos o modelo proposto para o Brasil utilizando estimação Bayesiana e encontramos que economias que sofrem restrição de colateral por parte das famílias tendem a sentir o impacto de choques monetários mais rapidamente devido a exposição do setor bancário a mudanças no salário esperado.
Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation
Resumo:
In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.