The performance of open-end Brazilian fixed income mutual funds for retail clients

From a financial perspective, this dissertation analyzes the Brazilian mutual fund industry performance for an average retail client. The most representative funds for the local population, that are the fixed income open-end ones, will be selected and their performance will be measured aiming to answer if clients of this industry obtained a proper return over their investments in the period between August 2010 and August 2013. A proper return will be understood as the preservation of the purchasing power of the individual´s savings, what is achieved with a positive performance of a mutual fund after discounting taxes, administrative fees and inflation. After obtaining an answer for the previous question, this dissertation will explore a possible alternative solution: Tesouro Direto, that is an example of a financial approach that could foster the disintermediation between savings and investments through electronic channels. New electronic platforms, with a broader scope, could be utilized to increase the efficiency of funding productive investments through better remunerating Brazilian savings. Tesouro Direto may point towards a new paradigm.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

O ombudsman bancário: uma solução extrajudicial adequada de conflitos envolvendo bancos e clientes e seu impacto nos litígios judiciais

A alta taxa de litigância judicial envolvendo bancos e clientes afeta o funcionamento do Poder Judiciário bem como a disponibilidade do crédito e as taxas de juros de forma negativa, por contribuir para a insegurança jurídica no mercado de crédito. Este trabalho busca diagnosticar as causas dessa litigância e os seus efeitos, verificar se o ombudsman bancário pode ser um mecanismo adequado à solução de disputas no setor financeiro, contribuindo para diminuir a litigância judicial. Pretende, também, propor mudanças institucionais, por meio da regulação bancária, que estabeleçam o sistema de ombudsman setorial no Brasil, fixando incentivos e desestímulos, para que ele seja eficiente e apresente resultados mais céleres, em face da realidade brasileira.