Padrões de concorrência no mercado brasileiro de torrefação e moagem de café e 1997 - 2005

This dissertation aims at analysing the patterns of competition from the period of 1997-2005 in the Brazilian roasted and grounded market. For the development of this research, a questionary elaborated by the researchers Maria Sylvia M. Saes and Elizabeth M. M. Q. Farina, that was utilized with the firms associated to the Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Café (ABIC) in 1997, will be used. The same questionary will be replicated in the year 2006 in order to capture changes within the patterns of competition along those 9 years. The methodology applied in this study is the case study, with unit of analysis being the Brazilian roasted and grounded industry. The research will be descripitive, since it will describe the pattern of competition in the Brazilian roasted and grounded market. However, the study is also exploratory due to the fact that there isn't any research that analyzes the specific object of study. The results obtained suggest that, taking into consideration the relevant variables of structure, conduct and performance of the industry of roasted and grounded coffee, the pattern of competition remained the same throughout the period 1997-2005.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Auctions of identical objects with single-unit demands : a survey

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.