Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Impacts of the proposals for tariff reductions in non-agricultural market access (Nama)

O Estudo Visa Avaliar os Impactos de Propostas Alternativas de Redução da Proteção Tarifária de Bens Não-Agrícolas Sobre a Economia Brasileira Usando um Modelo de Equilíbrio Geral Computável. Foram Simulados os Impactos da Implementação de Cortes Tarifários de Acordo com Diferentes Coeficientes para a Fórmula Suíça. as Simulações Foram Realizadas com o Modelo Gtap e Todos os Choques Tarifários Foram Calculados a Partir de Informações da Base de Dados Macmap. Além de Analisar Resultados Macroeconômicos e Setoriais, Também foi Testada a Sensibilidade dos Resultados em Relação ao Aumento das Elasticidades de Armington e À Ocorrência de uma Simultânea Liberalização de Tarifas Sobre Bens Agrícolas.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

O impacto da Lei Kandir sobre a economia paulista

Em setembro 1996 o Congresso Nacional aprovou uma lei de desoneração tributária destinada a reduzir o Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços para estimular as exportações de bens primários e semi-elaborados assim como investimentos em bens de capital e serviços. As principais razões para adotar esta desoneração fiscal eram estimular as exportações assim como, alavancar o investimento doméstico. Inicialmente a lei enfrentou enorme resistência política dos governos estaduais desde que ela implicaria em perdas substantivas de arrecadação dos estados. Como resultado, o Governo Federal negociou com os estados um mecanismo de compensação baseado no conceito de seguro-receita. Este projeto pretende avaliar (i) o impacto da lei nas exportações brasileiras e no nível de investimento e (ii) o seu efeito sobre as finanças estaduais decorrentes de uma eventual perda de receita tributária.

Mudanças recentes da Lei Kandir e seu impacto na economia paulista a partir de 1999

Em setembro 1996 o Congresso Nacional aprovou a Lei Complementar nº 87/96 destinada a reduzir o Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços para estimular as exportações de bens primários e semi-elaborados assim como investimentos em bens de capital e serviços. As principais razões para adotar esta desoneração fiscal eram estimular as exportações assim como, alavancar o investimento doméstico. Inicialmente a lei enfrentou enorme resistência política dos governos estaduais desde que ela implicaria em perdas substantivas de arrecadação dos estados. Como resultado, o Governo Federal negociou com os estados um mecanismo de compensação baseado no conceito de seguro-receita. Após editada a lei sofreu um contínuo processo de mudança que culminou com a edição de uma nova lei complementar, (LC 102/00). Este projeto pretende avaliar (i) as sucessivas mudanças na Lei nº 87/96 e (ii) o seu efeito sobre as finanças estaduais decorrentes de uma eventual perda de receita tributária.

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.

Determinants for political risk insurance of direct investments in emerging markets

Esta dissertação analisa os principais determinantes para investidores contratarem seguro de proteção de riscos políticos (PRI) para seus investimentos diretos, assim com o racional de sair de um PRI não renovando suas políticas. Esta dissertação contribui para a literatura existente sobre PRI, investigando os principais motivadores para PRI, tais como, riscos políticos, riscos econômicos, capacidade do patrocinador, instrumento utilizado para realizar o investimento (horizonte do investimento) determina combinações de PRI utilizando um modelo binário de resposta não linear. Um banco de dados único da Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) no período de 1990 até 2010, contendo informações sobre 693 investimentos incluindo sua cobertura para: seguro de risco de conversibilidade, seguro para risco de expropriação, riscos de guerras e distúrbios civis e riscos de quebra de contrato. Entretanto, percebemos que 47% destes seguros não permanecem ativos até o prazo originalmente contratado. Adicionalmente, instituições financeiras como garantidoras utilizam proporcionalmente mais dívida do que capital como instrumento de investimento e são largamente seguradas dentro da União Européia (EU). Por outro lado, investidores nos BRICs tendem a cobrir primariamente seus investimentos em infraestrutura. Resultados empíricos incluem que um aumento nos riscos de quebra de contrato e guerra civil estão totalmente correlacionados com a renovação de contratos de seguro, assim como um aumento da percepção de risco do pais que está recebendo o investimento.

Predicting Amazon Deforestation through the deterninants of demand for agricultural land

This paper develops a model of deforestation pressure in the Amazon. It is based on the determinants of demand for agricultural land, i.e. the interactions between population dynamics, urbanization and the growth of local markets, land prices, and government spending and policies. The mo deI is estimated using data from the period 1970 - 1985, and predictions for the period 1985 - 2010 are made under explicit assumptions about the underlying factors of deforestation. The predictions indicate that economic growth in the Amazon is likely to continue at high rates even if the federal government abandons its aggressive development policy. Deforestation will be much smaller if they do, though, since the active development policies tend to promote wasteful use of land.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derive

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Project portfolio management: an analysis from the insurance industry IT area

This paper aims to bring more information related to the critical question "how IT areas of insurance companies are defining and delivering their strategic initiatives Portfolios?" and make conclusions based on the collected data. To reach these interpretations, it is composed of a theoretical investigation on the theme, a strategy delineation for the research methodology and a conclusion presentation based on the findings. In this last part, this study concluded that explored organization does not applied a sufficient number of best practices answering the critical question as "the company is not mature on this subject".