Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Yet another reason to tax goods

The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.

Ideological changes and tax structure: Latin American countries during the nineties

Sabatini (2002) and Roberts and Wibbles (1999) Pointed Out That Voters in Latin American Countries are no Longer Choosing According to Their Ideological Preferences. Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) Showed That the Tax Choice In Oecd Countries Does not Follow the Ideological Pattern of Party Preferences. the Most Robust Result of This Work Shows That the Tax Choice in Latin American Countries Still Depends on This Ideological Preference. We Also Verified That Changes in the Tax Structure Depend on Changes Both in the Tax Burden and the Openness of the Economy

The effects of tax incentives for small firms on employment levels

This paper will examine the effects of tax incentives for small businesses on employment level evaluating a program with this purpose implemented in Brazil in the 1990s. We first develop a theoretical framework which guides both the de nition of the parameters of interest and their identi cation. Selection problems both into the treatment group and into the data sample are tackled by combining fixed effects methods and regression discontinuity design on alternative sub-samples of a longitudinal database of manufacturing firms. The results show that on the one hand the size composition of the treated fi rms may be changed due to the survival of some smaller firms that would have exited had it not been eligible to the program. On the other hand, the treated firms who do not depend on the program to survive do employ more workers.

Sacrifice and efficiency of the income tax schedule

We investigate the efficiency of equal sacrifice tax schedules in an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971): a continuum of individuals with identical preferences defined over consumption and leisure who differ with respect to their labor market productivity. Using a separable specification for preferences we derive the minimum equal sacrifice allocation and recover the tax schedule that implements it. The separable specification allows us to use the methodology developed by Werning (2007b) to check whether the schedule is efficient, that is, whether there is no alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. We find that inefficiency does not arise for most parametrizations we use to approximate the US economy. For the few cases for which inefficiency does arise, it does so only for very high levels of income and marginal tax rates.

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.

On the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules

In an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971), we investigate the efficiency of labor income tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle. Starting from a given government revenue level, we use Werning’s (2007b) approach to assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule to the one derived under the equal sacrifice principle that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. For our preferred parametrizations of the problem we find that inefficiency only arises at very high levels of income. We also show how the multipliers of the Pareto problem may be extracted from the data and used to find the implicit marginal social weights associated with each level of income.

Essays in taxation and savings

Esta tese é composta por três artigos. Dois deles investigam assuntos afeitos a tributação e o terceiro é um artigo sobre o tema “poupança”'. Embora os objetos de análise sejam distintos, os três possuem como característica comum a aplicação de técnicas de econometria de dados em painel a bases de dados inéditas. Em dois dos artigos, utiliza-se estimação por GMM em modelos dinâmicos. Por sua vez, o artigo remanescente é uma aplicação de modelos de variável dependente latente. Abaixo, apresenta-se um breve resumo de cada artigo, começando pelos dois artigos de tributação, que dividem uma seção comum sobre o ICMS (o imposto estadual sobre valor adicionado) e terminando com o artigo sobre poupança. O primeiro artigo analisa a importância da fiscalização como instrumento para deter a evasão de tributos e aumentar a receita tributária, no caso de um imposto sobre valor adicionado, no contexto de um país em desenvolvimento. O estudo é realizado com dados do estado de São Paulo. Para tratar questões relativas a endogeneidade e inércia na série de receita tributária, empregam-se técnicas de painel dinâmico. Utiliza-se como variáveis de controle o nível do PIB regional e duas proxies para esforço fiscal: a quantidade e o valor das multas tributárias. Os resultados apontam impacto significativo do esforço fiscal nas receitas tributárias. O artigo evidencia, indiretamente, a forma como a evasão fiscal é afetada pela penalidade aplicada aos casos de sonegação. Suas conclusões também são relevantes no contexto das discussões sobre o federalismo fiscal brasileiro, especialmente no caso de uma reforma tributária potencial. O segundo artigo examina uma das principais tarefas das administrações tributárias: a escolha periódica de contribuintes para auditoria. A melhora na eficiência dos mecanismos de seleção de empresas tem o potencial de impactar positivamente a probabilidade de detecção de fraudes fiscais, provendo melhor alocação dos escassos recursos fiscais. Neste artigo, tentamos desenvolver este mecanismo calculando a probabilidade de sonegação associada a cada contribuinte. Isto é feito, no universo restrito de empresas auditadas, por meio da combinação “ótima” de diversos indicadores fiscais existentes e de informações dos resultados dos procedimentos de auditoria, em modelos de variável dependente latente. Após calculados os coeficientes, a probabilidade de sonegação é calculada para todo o universo de contribuintes. O método foi empregado em um painel com micro-dados de empresas sujeitas ao recolhimento de ICMS no âmbito da Delegacia Tributária de Guarulhos, no estado de São Paulo. O terceiro artigo analisa as baixas taxas de poupança dos países latino-americanos nas últimas décadas. Utilizando técnicas de dados em painel, identificam-se os determinantes da taxa de poupança. Em seguida, faz-se uma análise contrafactual usando a China, que tem apresentado altas taxas de poupança no mesmo período, como parâmetro. Atenção especial é dispensada ao Brasil, que tem ficado muito atrás dos seus pares no grupo dos BRICs neste quesito. O artigo contribui para a literatura existente em vários sentidos: emprega duas amplas bases de dados para analisar a influência de uma grande variedade de determinantes da taxa de poupança, incluindo variáveis demográficas e de previdência social; confirma resultados previamente encontrados na literatura, com a robustez conferida por bases de dados mais ricas; para alguns países latino-americanos, revela que as suas taxas de poupança tenderiam a aumentar se eles tivessem um comportamento mais semelhante ao da China em outras áreas, mas o incremento não seria tão dramático.

Taxing hard-to-tax markets

Tax enforcement costs constrain the government s ability to observe economic transactions, giving rise to hard-to-tax (HTT) markets. In these markets transactions are untaxed and consumers are better o¤ than in taxed markets. This paper studies a novel approach to combat evasion in HTT markets: consumer auditing, which rewards consumers for re- questing transaction receipts. We develop a Hotelling-type spatial model of sales taxation to analyze the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the implementation of this policy. We and that consumer auditing allows for a lower tax rate and greater provision of the public good in the economy. We show that this policy not only can enhance welfare, but also equalize utilities of consumers across markets

The effects of small firm tax incentives on employment levels

This paper aims to evaluate the impact on employment growth of a tax incentive program targeting Brazilian manufacturing small businesses (SIMPLES). This evaluation is conducted for two distinct periods: for the year 1997, when the program was first implemented, and for the year 1999, when the eligibility rule was modified to allow the eligibility of a broader group of firms. The evaluation takes into account two distinct channels through which the charted effects operate. The first is the employment variation in the firms that became eligible for the incentives, and the second is the change in the survival probability experienced by the same group of firms. Moreover, each of these channels can be activated either by the tax reduction dimension of the program or by its dimension of red tape simplification. Our results identify positive effects on employment growth for the tax incentive program only in the dimension of red tape simplification and its effects on the 1997 sample.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.