The influence of materialism on consumption indebtedness in the context of low income consumers from the city of São Paulo

This research is in the domains of materialism, consumer vulnerability and consumption indebtedness, concepts frequently approached in the literature on consumer behavior, macro-marketing and economic psychology. The influence of materialism on consumer indebtedness is investigated within a context that is characterized by poverty and by factors that cause vulnerability, such as high interest rates, limited access to credit and to quality affordable goods. The objectives of this research are: to produce a materialism scale that is well adapted to its environment, characterizing materialism adequately for the population studied; to compare results obtained with results of other studies; and to measure the relationship between materialism, socio-demographic variables, attitude to debt and consumption indebtedness. The primary data used in the analyses were collected from field research carried out in August, 2005 that relied on a probabilistic household sample of 450 low income individuals who live in poor regions of the city of Sao Paulo. The materialism scale, adapted and translated into Portuguese from Richins (2004), proved to be very successful and encourages new work in the area. It was noted that younger adults tend to be more materialistic than older ones; that illiterate adults tend to be less materialistic than those who did literacy courses when they were already adults; and that gender, income and race are not associated with the materialism construct. Among the other results, a logistic regression model was developed in order to distinguish those individuals who have an installment plan payment booklet from those who do not, based on materialism, socio-demographic variables and purchasing and consumer habits. The proposed model confirms materialism as a behavioral variable useful for forecasting the probability of an individual getting into debt in order to consume, in some cases almost doubling the chance of occurrence of this event. Findings confirm the thesis that it is not only adverse economic factors that lead people to get into debt; and that the study of demand for credit for consumption purposes must, of necessity, include variables of a psychological nature. It is suggested that the low income materialistic consumer experiences feelings of powerlessness and exclusion because of the gap that exists between their possessions and their desires. Lines of conduct to combat this marginalization from the consumer society are drawn targeting marketing professionals, public policy makers and vulnerability researchers. Finally, the possibility of new studies involving the materialism construct, which is central to literature on consumer behavior, albeit little used in empirical studies in Brazil, are discussed.

Insights on corporate sustainability and share value: an event study for Brazilian market

Em meio ao crescente volume de publicações sobre sustentabilidade e finanças, diversas pesquisas internacionais e brasileiras têm abordado a relação entre empresas classificadas como sustentáveis e o retorno de suas ações. Nesta mesma linha, este trabalho utilizou o método de estudos de eventos para verificar se entre 2005 e 2013 houve retornos anormais quando as empresas entraram e saíram do Índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial (ISE). Além de contemplar um período mais atualizado do que seus precedentes, este estudo difere-se dos demais ao analisar o as observações individualmente e ao buscar estabelecer uma relação dos retornos anormais acumulados com as variáveis governança corporativa, tamanho, rentabilidade e alavancagem. Os resultados mostraram que embora não haja evidências conclusivas quando os casos são tomados individualmente, em conjunto eles indicam que a inclusão e a exclusão do ISE geram retornos anormais significativos, positivos e negativos respectivamente, em linha com a teoria dos stakeholders. Quanto às variáveis de controle, nenhuma apresentou relação com os retornos anormais acumulados.

Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

Nesta dissertação, consideram-se trocas em mercados descentralizados com seleção adversa. Diferentemente da literatura até o momento, supomos que vendedores informados (e não compradores desinformados) fazem ofertas take-it-or-leave-it, de forma que sinalização através de preços é possível. Estabelecemos uma caracterização parcial do conjunto de equilíbrio, encontramos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de um equilíbrio e mostramos que todo equilíbrio apresenta sinalização se o problema de seleção adversa for suficientemente severo. Além disso, provamos o resultado surpreendente que o maior bem-estar atingido em equilíbrio é invariante às fricções do mercado. Também apresentamos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de equilíbrios separantes, que caracterizamos completamente. Mostramos que o conjunto de payoffs associados a equilíbrios separantes é invariante às fricções. Concluímos com uma caracterização completa do conjunto de equilíbrio com apenas dois tipos, e comparamos nossos resultados com os de Moreno e Wooders (2010), que analisam o caso em que compradores têm todo o poder de mercado. Nossos resultados mostram que sinalização através dos preços tem um impacto não trivial tanto nos resultados do mercado quanto no bem-estar.

Adverse selection with endogenous entry

Usando como base o ambiente descrito em Moreno e Wooders (2010), neste trabalho, analisamos trocas em um ambiente dinâmico, descentralizado e com seleção adversa. Ao contrário dos autores e da literatura, não consideramos a proporção de ativos de alta qualidade entrantes como independente das características do mercado. Desse modo, adaptamos o modelo dinâmico básico de seleção adversa para incorporar a decisão do vendedor sobre a possibilidade de pagar ou não um preço e transformar seu ativo de baixa qualidade em um ativo de alta qualidade antes de entrar no mercado. E, sob essas condições, mostramos que o bem-estar pode se comportar de maneira diferente do modelo tradicional.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Supply chain turbulence: the impact of a mid-range event in multi-tier, multi-dimension supply chains

Nota: A autora agradece à Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) pela concessão de bolsa de estudos para o desenvolvimento deste projeto de pesquisa.

The influence of the tag-along rights in the value of companies: an event study of the effects on the market and service companies

The aim of this work is to check the effect of granting tag-along rights to stockholders by analyzing the behavior of the return of the stock. To do so we carried out event studies for a group of 21 company stocks, divided into service provider companies and others, who granted this right to their stockholders after Law 10,303 was passed in October, 2001. In the test we used two models for estimating abnormal returns: adjusted to the market and adjusted to the risk and market. The results of the tests we carried out based on these models did not capture abnormal returns (surpluses), telling us that the tag-along rights did not affect the pattern of daily returns of the stocks of companies traded on BOVESPA (The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange). We did not expect this result because of the new corporate governance practices adopted by companies in Brazil.

Do insiders get abnormal returns? : event studies on the trades of insiders of the firms with differentiated corporate governance of the São Paulo stock exchange

The subject insider trading is controversial. This paper presents series of event studies carried through on the trades with stocks of the firm carried by insiders with the objective to detect abnormal returns, based on the access to privileged information. The sample is composed by trades performed by insiders of the companies with stocks negotiated in the São Paulo Stock Exchange, that are classified as firms with differentiated corporate governance. Indication that trades performed by insiders resulted in abnormal returns compared to the statistically significant expected ones, as in the purchases of common shares; or for selling of preferred stocks.

How to neutralize the adverse developmental effects of the Dutch disease?

This paper addresses the subject of the adverse developmental effects of the Dutch disease: the theory, the experience of Latin America over the last decade, and the economic policy management issues on what to do about it.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.