Inequality and economic growth in Latin

Latin America is the region that bears the highest rates of inequality in the world. Deininger and Squire (1996) showed that Latin American countries achieved only minor reductions in inequality between 1960 and 1990. On the other hand, East Asian countries, recurrently cited in recent literature on this issue, have significantly narrowed the gap in income inequality, while achieving sustained economic growth. These facts have triggered a renewed discussion on the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. According to the above literature, income inequality could have an adverse effect on countries’ growth rates. The main authors who spouse this line of thinking are Persson and Tebellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1996), Bénabou (1996), and Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998). More recently, however, articles were published that questioned the evidence presented previously. Representatives of this new point of view, namely Li and Zou (1998), Barro (1999), Deininger and Olinto (2000) and Forbes (2000), believe that the relation between these variables can be positive, i.e., income inequality can indeed foster economic growth. Using this literature as a starting point, this article seeks to evaluate the relation between income inequality and economic growth in Latin America, based on a 13-country panel, from 1970 to 1995. After briefly reviewing the above articles, this study estimates the per capita GDP and growth rate equations, based on the neoclassical approach for economic growth. It also estimates the Kuznets curve for this sample of countries. Econometric results are in line with recent work conducted in this area – particularly Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) – and confirm the positive relation between inequality and growth, and also support Kuznets hypothesis.

How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.