The consequences of the culture aspect and the power distance in the execution of global strategies in multinational companies in Brazil

One of the challenges presented by the current conjecture in Global Companies is to recognize and understand that the culture and levels in structure of the Power Distance in Organizations in different countries contribute, significantly, toward the failure or success of their strategies. The alignment between the implementation and execution of new strategies for projects intended for the success of the Organization as a whole, rather than as an individual part thereof, is an important step towards reducing the impacts of Power Distance (PDI) on the success of business strategies. A position at odds with this understanding by Companies creates boundaries that increase organizational chasms, also taking into consideration relevant aspects such as, FSAs (Firm-Specific Advantages) and CSAs (Country-Specific Advantages). It is also important that the Organizations based in countries or regions of low Power Distance (PDI) between its individuals be more flexible and prepared to ask and to hear the suggestions from Regional and Local Offices. Thus, the purpose of this study is to highlight the elements of effective strategy implementation considering the relevant aspects at all levels of global corporate culture that justify the influences of power distance when implementing new strategies and also to minimize the impacts of this internal business relationship. This study also recognizes that other corporate and cultural aspects are relevant for the success of business strategies so consider, for instance, the lack of alignment between global and regional/local organizations, the need for competent leadership resources, as well as the challenges that indicate the distance between the hierarchical levels ─ Headquarters and Regional Office ─ as some of the various causes that prevent the successful execution of global strategies. Finally, we show that the execution of the strategy cannot be treated as a construction solely created by the Headquarters or by only one Board and that it needs to be understood as a system aimed at interacting with the surroundings.

Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence

Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.