Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

A model of capital accumulation and rent-seeking

A simple model incorporating rent-seeking into the standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation is presented. It embodies the idea that the performance of an economy depends on the efficiency of its institutions. It is shown that welfare is positively affected by the institutional efficiency, although output is not necessarily so. It is also shown that an economy with a monopolistic rent-seeker performs better than one with a competitive rent-seeking industry.

Money supply and capital accumulation on the transition path revisited

Fischer (1979) and Asako (1983) analyze the sign of the correlation between the growth rate of money and the rate of capital accumulation on the transition path. Both plug a CRRA utility (based on a Cobb-Douglas and a Leontief function, respectively) into Sidrauski's model - yet return contrasting results. The present analysis, by using a more general CES utility, presents both of those settings and conclusions as limiting cases, and generates economic gures more consistent with reality (for instance, the interest-rate elasticity of the money demands derived from those previous works is necessarily 1 and 0, respectively).

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.