Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and inflation inertia: preliminary version

When policy rules are changed, the effect of nominal rigidities should be modelled through endogenous pricing rules. We endogenize Taylor (1979) type pricing rule to examine the output effects of monetary disinflations. We derive optimal fixed-price time-dependent rules in inflationary steady states and during disinflations. We also develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through disinflation. This allows us to reevaluate the output costs of monetary disinflation, including aspects as the role of the initial leveI of inflation and the importance of the degree of credibility of the policy change.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

Simple calvo economies with heterogeneous pricing

A motivação para este trabalho vem dos principais resultados de Carvalho e Schwartzman (2008), onde a heterogeneidade surge a partir de diferentes regras de ajuste de preço entre os setores. Os momentos setoriais da duração da rigidez nominal são su cientes para explicar certos efeitos monetários. Uma vez que concordamos que a heterogeneidade é relevante para o estudo da rigidez de preços, como poderíamos escrever um modelo com o menor número possível de setores, embora com um mínimo de heterogeneidade su ciente para produzir qualquer impacto monetário desejado, ou ainda, qualquer três momentos da duração? Para responder a esta questão, este artigo se restringe a estudar modelos com hazard-constante e considera que o efeito acumulado e a dinâmica de curto-prazo da política monetária são boas formas de se resumir grandes economias heterogêneas. Mostramos que dois setores são su cientes para resumir os efeitos acumulados de choques monetários, e economias com 3 setores são boas aproximações para a dinâmica destes efeitos. Exercícios numéricos para a dinâmica de curto prazo de uma economia com rigidez de informação mostram que aproximar 500 setores usando apenas 3 produz erros inferiores a 3%. Ou seja, se um choque monetário reduz o produto em 5%, a economia aproximada produzirá um impacto entre 4,85% e 5,15%. O mesmo vale para a dinâmica produzida por choques de nível de moeda em uma economia com rigidez de preços. Para choques na taxa de crescimento da moeda, a erro máximo por conta da aproximação é de 2,4%.

Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-ependent pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how credibility affects the outcome of a disinflation in a model with endogenous timedependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evaluate the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation, but the pattern of the output path is more realistic in the case with learning.

Optimal-state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflationary inertia

This paper examines the output losses caused by disinflation and the role of credibility in a model where pricing mIes are optimal and individual prices are rigid. Individual nominal rigidity is modeled as resulting from menu costs. The interaction between optimal pricing mIes and credibility is essential in determining the inflationary inertia. A continued period of high inflation generates an asymmetric distribution of price deviations, with more prices that are substantially lower than their desired leveIs than prices that are substantially higher than the optimal ones. When disinflation is not credible, inflationary inertia is engendered by this asymmetry: idiosyncratic shocks trigger more upward than downward adjustments. A perfect1y credible disinflation causes an immediate change of pricing rules which, by rendering the price deviation distribution less asymmetric, practically annihilates inflationary inertia. An implication of our model is that stabilization may be sucessful even when credibility is low, provided that it is preceded by a mechanism of price alignment. We also develop an analytical framework for analyzing imperfect credibility cases.

Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-dependent pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how the policymaker’s credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evalute the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. We show that, in both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation.

O Acordo Antecipado de Preços – APA como solução para reduzir a insegurança jurídica na aplicação das regras de Preço de Transferência no Brasil

O presente trabalho monográfico é baseado fundamentalmente na comparação da legislação estrangeira e nos potenciais conflitos trazido pela doutrina brasileira na instituição de outros mecanismos de solução de controvérsias administrativos, já em operação no Brasil. Objetivando verificar a possibilidade de aplicação do Acordo Antecipado de Preços no direito brasileiro. Para tanto é verificado se o APA é uma forma eficiente de solução das inseguranças trazidas pela aplicabilidade das regras de preços de transferência em virtude da natureza específica das transações operacionalizadas entre pessoas vinculadas.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Affine processes, arbitrage-Free Term structures of legendre polynomials,and option pricing

Multivariate Affine term structure models have been increasingly used for pricing derivatives in fixed income markets. In these models, uncertainty of the term structure is driven by a state vector, while the short rate is an affine function of this vector. The model is characterized by a specific form for the stochastic differential equation (SDE) for the evolution of the state vector. This SDE presents restrictions on its drift term which rule out arbitrages in the market. In this paper we solve the following inverse problem: Suppose the term structure of interest rates is modeled by a linear combination of Legendre polynomials with random coefficients. Is there any SDE for these coefficients which rules out arbitrages? This problem is of particular empirical interest because the Legendre model is an example of factor model with clear interpretation for each factor, in which regards movements of the term structure. Moreover, the Affine structure of the Legendre model implies knowledge of its conditional characteristic function. From the econometric perspective, we propose arbitrage-free Legendre models to describe the evolution of the term structure. From the pricing perspective, we follow Duffie et al. (2000) in exploring Legendre conditional characteristic functions to obtain a computational tractable method to price fixed income derivatives. Closing the article, the empirical section presents precise evidence on the reward of implementing arbitrage-free parametric term structure models: The ability of obtaining a good approximation for the state vector by simply using cross sectional data.