Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Global law in pieces fragmentation, regimes and pluralism

The idea that life undergoes a process of functional differentiation, and that, as a consequence, law becomes increasingly specialized – and maybe even transforms in its very nature – is now widespread. The specialized clusters of law or regulation are very often called regimes, in the international arena, international or transnational regimes. This paper deals, first, with three strong representations of international regimes and discusses some of their problems. It argues that, in order to make a good use of the category, it is necessary to keep in mind the differentiation between law and non-law in the wider context of governance. It then turns, firstly, to the notion of regimes as fragments of a unified and coherent public international law order and, secondly, as meeting points of regulations emerging from different legal orders as well as from other non-legal sources. Within public international law, regimes are seen as related to what is called the double fragmentation of that legal order. As clusters of regulation within a wider global regulatory order, regimes are put in relation to two types of legal or regulatory pluralism.