Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Racionalidade e previsibilidade no mercado brasileiro de ações: uma aplicação de modelos de valor presente

Utilizando dados financeiros brasileiros do Ibovespa, testa-se a validade dos modelos de valor presente (MVP) no mercado de ações. Estes modelos relacionam o preço de uma ação ao seu fluxo de caixa futuro esperado (dividendos) trazido a valor presente utilizando uma taxa de desconto constante ou variante ao longo do tempo. Associada a estes modelos está a questão da previsibilidade dos retornos num contexto de expectativas racionais. Neste artigo é realizada uma análise multivariada num arcabouço de séries temporais utilizando a técnica de Autorregressões Vetoriais. Os resultados empíricos corroboram, em grande medida, o MVP para o Ibovespa brasileiro, pois há uma igualdade estatística entre a previsão ótima do mercado para o spread do equilíbrio de longo prazo e seus valores observados.

Why the ‘Rest’ doesn’t need foreign finance

The Rest will be able to catch up and grow faster than the West only if it goes against a “received truth”, namely that capital-rich countries should transfer their capital to capital-poor countries. This intuitive truth is the mantra that the West cites to justify its occupation of the markets of developing countries with its finance and its multinationals. Classical Developmentalism successfully criticized the unequal exchange involved in trade liberalization, but it didn’t succeed in criticizing foreign finance. This task has been recently achieved by New Developmentalism and its developmental macroeconomics, which shows that countries will invest and grow more if they don’t run current account deficits, even when these deficits are financed by foreign direct investment