Citizens and the future of multilateralism in a polycentric world at 2030: the perspectives of emerging countries for the trading system: the impasse of WTO, the trends of mega agreements, the logic of value chains and the advent of consumers concerns on international trade

A new paradigm is modeling the World: evolutionary innovations in all fronts, new information technologies, huge mobility of capital, use of risky financial tools, globalization of production, new emerging powers and the impact of consumer concerns on governmental policies. These phenomena are shaping the World and forcing the advent of a new World Order in the Multilateral Monetary, Financial, and Trading System. The effects of this new paradigm are also transforming global governance. The political and economic orders established after the World War and centered on the multilateral model of UN, IMF, World Bank, and the GATT, leaded by the developed countries, are facing significant challenges. The rise of China and emerging countries shifted the old model to a polycentric World, where the governance of these organizations are threatened by emerging countries demanding a bigger participation in the role and decision boards of these international bodies. As a consequence, multilateralism is being confronted by polycentrism. Negotiations for a more representative voting process and the pressure for new rules to cope with the new demands are paralyzing important decisions. This scenario is affecting seriously not only the Monetary and Financial Systems but also the Multilateral Trading System. International trade is facing some significant challenges: a serious deadlock to conclude the last round of the multilateral negotiation at the WTO, the fragmentation of trade rules by the multiplication of preferential and mega agreements, the arrival of a new model of global production and trade leaded by global value chains that is threatening the old trade order, and the imposition of new sets of regulations by private bodies commanded by transnationals to support global value chains and non-governmental organizations to reflect the concerns of consumers in the North based on their precautionary attitude about sustainability of products made in the World. The lack of any multilateral order in this new regulation is creating a big cacophony of rules and developing a new regulatory war of the Global North against the Global South. The objective of this paper is to explore how these challenges are affecting the Tradinge System and how it can evolve to manage these new trends.

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

Microfoundations of open innovation: the creation of open innovation management organizations

Desde que Chesbrough (2003) cunhou o termo inovação aberta, o conceito tem atraído uma atenção crescente tanto no meio acadêmico quanto no mundo empresarial. Apesar dos esforços crescentes em explorar práticas de inovação aberta, muitas perguntas permanecem sem resposta. A pesquisa acadêmica expandiu o foco abordando o tema de forma bastante ampla como gestão da inovação, estratégia empresarial, comportamento organizacional e políticas públicas. Ao mesmo tempo, gestores também têm explorado na prática o conceito de inovação aberta de formas muito diversificadas. Levando em conta a variabilidade das práticas de inovação aberta, este estudo visa fornecer microfundamentos para a inovação aberta, adotando a teoria de effectuation. A teoria de effectuation foi originalmente desenvolvida no campo da pesquisa sobre empreendedorismo. Pode ser definida como um conjunto de princípios de tomada de decisão que pode ser ensinado e aprendido, formando uma lógica global empregada por empreendedores com expertise frente a situações de incerteza durante a criação de novos empreendimentos e novos mercados (SARASVATHY, 2001; 2008). Nós demostramos que a teoria effectuation tem a consistência para fornecer uma contribuição sólida no nível micro das práticas de inovação aberta. Neste trabalho, realizamos um estudo de caso extensivo sobre uma organização de gestão da inovação aberta destinada a promover a colaboração entre Brasil e Suécia. Examinamos os processos de tomada de decisão de 13 especialistas em R&D e gerentes de inovação que juntos representam oito diferentes entidades envolvidas em sua criação. Como resultado de nossa pesquisa, identificamos e descrevemos a metodologia de tomada de decisão utilizada pelos gestores de inovação envolvidos na criação de uma organização dedicada à gestão da inovação aberta. As percepções frutos da pesquisa realizada nos permitiu desenvolver um quadro de tomada de decisão com base nas teorias de effectuation e inovação aberta, capaz de apoiar gestores na criação de novas organizações dedicadas à gestão da inovação aberta.

A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.