Optimal-state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflationary inertia

This paper examines the output losses caused by disinflation and the role of credibility in a model where pricing mIes are optimal and individual prices are rigid. Individual nominal rigidity is modeled as resulting from menu costs. The interaction between optimal pricing mIes and credibility is essential in determining the inflationary inertia. A continued period of high inflation generates an asymmetric distribution of price deviations, with more prices that are substantially lower than their desired leveIs than prices that are substantially higher than the optimal ones. When disinflation is not credible, inflationary inertia is engendered by this asymmetry: idiosyncratic shocks trigger more upward than downward adjustments. A perfect1y credible disinflation causes an immediate change of pricing rules which, by rendering the price deviation distribution less asymmetric, practically annihilates inflationary inertia. An implication of our model is that stabilization may be sucessful even when credibility is low, provided that it is preceded by a mechanism of price alignment. We also develop an analytical framework for analyzing imperfect credibility cases.