Essays in applied econometrics

Using a unique dataset on Brazilian nominal and real yield curves combined with daily survey forecasts of macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, inflation, and exchange rate movements, we identify the effect of surprises to the Brazilian interbank target rate on expected future nominal and real short rates, term premia, and inflation expectations. We find that positive surprises to target rates lead to higher expected nominal and real interest rates and reduced nominal and inflation term premia. We also find a strongly positive relation between both real and nominal term premia and measures of dispersion in survey forecasts. Uncertainty about future exchange rates is a particularly important driver of variations in Brazilian term premia.

Balance of payments dominance: its implications for macroeconomic policy

This paper defines “balance of payments dominance” as a macroeconomic regime in which the short-term macroeconomic dynamics is essentially determined by external shocks, positive or negative. It argues that this is the predominant regime in emerging and developing countries. Trade shocks play an important role but the major procyclical shocks are associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Policy challenges are associated not only with the management of such shocks but also with the need to enhance the space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as boom-bust cycles tend to pressure macroeconomic policies to behave in a procyclical way. Under these conditions, the best bet is to design policies to reduce external vulnerabilities through a mix of administered exchange rate policies, very active foreign exchange reserve management, reduced reliance on external borrowing, and macroprudential regulations, including those directly affecting capital flows. Countercyclical fiscal policy can also play a role but face strong economic and political economy challenges.

Dinâmica política e política de gestão: partidos de esquerda e a adoção das parcerias com organizações sociais no Brasil 2007 a 2015

O objetivo desta Tese é compreender a atuação de partidos à esquerda do espectro político face à agenda de reformas da gestão pública. Especificamente, este estudo busca entender as motivações e interesses de governos liderados por partidos de esquerda ao expandirem e consolidarem parcerias com Organizações Sociais (OS) para provisão de serviços públicos – política voltada para a gestão pública, criticada por aqueles partidos e que contraria o interesse de parte de sua base social: o funcionalismo público. A pesquisa contribui para o debate ao intricar ao tema da gestão pública o debate político. Para alguns autores, esta é uma das principais lacunas dos estudos da área. Para atingir este objetivo foi realizado um estudo de casos múltiplos nos estados da Bahia e Pernambuco durante os governos do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) e Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB). Dentre as experiências estaduais recentes, os casos selecionados se destacam pela rápida expansão das parcerias com OS. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam que a expansão da parceria com as Organizações Sociais nos dois governos foi motivada pelas restrições orçamentárias, pela ineficiência dos equipamentos públicos e pelas características intrínsecas ao modelo, principalmente aquelas com poder de torná-lo mais ágil. A situação de grave crise setorial – saúde, nos dois casos estudados – foi fator chave para a expansão do modelo. A pesquisa também identificou que as resistências políticas foram minimizadas através da ampliação das alianças políticas e da distribuição de cargos e, para diminuir as resistências da base social dos partidos, os governos se aproximaram dos sindicatos e das categorias de classe mais afetadas por essa política de gestão.

Balance of payments dominance : its implocations for macroeconomic policy

This paper defines “balance of payments dominance” as a macroeconomic regime in which the short-term macroeconomic dynamics is essentially determined by external shocks, positive or negative. It argues that this is the predominant regime in emerging and developing countries. Trade shocks play an important role but the major procyclical shocks are associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Policy challenges are associated not only with the management of such shocks but also with the need to enhance the space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as boom-bust cycles tend to pressure macroeconomic policies to behave in a procyclical way. Under these conditions, the best bet is to design policies to reduce external vulnerabilities through a mix of administered exchange rate flexibility, very active foreign exchange reserve management, reduced reliance on external borrowing, and macroprudential regulations, including those directly affecting capital flows. Countercyclical fiscal policy can also play a role but face strong economic and political economy challenges.

The impact of social security reform on occupational and retirement behavior : a quantitative assessment for Brazil

Population ageing is a problem that countries will have to cope with within a few years. How would changes in the social security system affect individual behaviour? We develop a multi-sectoral life-cycle model with both retirement and occupational choices to evaluate what are the macroeconomic impacts of social security reforms. We calibrate the model to match 2011 Brazilian economy and perform a counterfactual exercise of the long-run impacts of a recently adopted reform. In 2013, the Brazilian government approximated the two segregated social security schemes, imposing a ceiling on public pensions. In the benchmark equilibrium, our modelling economy is able to reproduce the early retirement claiming, the agents' stationary distribution among sectors, as well as the social security deficit and the public job application decision. In the counterfactual exercise, we find a significant reduction of 55\% in the social security deficit, an increase of 1.94\% in capital-to-output ratio, with both output and capital growing, a delay in retirement claims of public workers and a modification in the structure of agents applying to the public sector job.

Learning in peer-to-peer markets: evidence from Airbnb

Peer-to-peer markets are highly uncertain environments due to the constant presence of shocks. As a consequence, sellers have to constantly adjust to these shocks. Dynamic Pricing is hard, especially for non-professional sellers. We study it in an accommodation rental marketplace, Airbnb. With scraped data from its website, we: 1) describe pricing patterns consistent with learning; 2) estimate a demand model and use it to simulate a dynamic pricing model. We simulate it under three scenarios: a) with learning; b) without learning; c) with full information. We have found that information is an important feature concerning rental markets. Furthermore, we have found that learning is important for hosts to improve their profits.

Capital misallocation and mitigating policies

The purpose of this work is to study the role for government in mitigating capital misallocation. We develop an entrepreneurship model in which heterogeneous producers face collateral constraints on production, but can hedge idiosyncratic shocks. Hedging works as a tool for reallocating resources to states in which they are more productively deployed, and can alleviate the effect of the financial frictions and be a counteracting force to capital misallocation. Government incentives to hedging improve workers’ welfare in steady state through an increase in TFP and wages. The intervention leads to a reduction in the rate of return of entrepreneurs and an increase in wealth dispersion. These two effects cause entrepreneurial welfare to decrease.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.