Desafios para a regulação de um mercado competitivo de gás natural no estado de São Paulo

O trabalho tem o objetivo de apresentar os principais desafios e algumas propostas para a formação e regulação de um mercado de gás natural mais competitivo no Estado de São Paulo. São descritos, caracterizados e analisados os principais pontos do estudo: a estrutura da indústria, aspectos econômicos, a regulação do setor, e aprendizados de algumas experiências internacionais. Posteriormente, são oferecidas alternativas que poderiam servir como possibilidades para o desenvolvimento de um mercado de livre concorrência mais amplo.

Effects of trade policy on technology adoption and investment

This paper studies the consequences of trade policy for the adoption of new technologies. It develops a dynamic international trade model with two sectors. Workers in manufacturing decide if new technologies are used, capital owners then choose investment. We analyze three different arrangements: free trade, tariffs, and quotas. In the model economy, free trade as well as tariffs guarantee that the most productive technology available will be used. In contrasL under a quota the most productive technology available will not be used at all times. Further, in the latter case investment and the capital stock are smaller than in the former one. Finally, there exists parameter values for which the computed difference in GDP is a factor of thirty.

Formation and destruction of coalition groups under economic growth

This paper introduces a model economy in which formation of coalition groups under technological progress is generated endogenously. The coalition formation depends crucially on the rate of arrival of new technologies. In the model, an agent working in the saroe technology for more than one period acquires skills, part of which is specific to this technology. These skills increase the agent productivity. In this case, if he has worked more than one period with the same technology he has incentives to construct a coalition to block the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, in every sector the workers have incentives to construct a coalition and to block the adoption of new technologies. They will block every time that a technology stay in use for more than one period.

Technology adoption and effects of transfers across locations

This paper develops a two-period model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the e¤ects of transfers across locations on convergence, growth and welfare. The model has two important features. First, locations are asymmetric as it is assumed that there are more specialized occupations in the more developed one. Second, the returns on the investment to acquire new technology depend positively on the level of each region’s knowledge and on the level of the world knowledge assumed to be available to all. In one hand, the poor region has a disadvantage as it has a lower stock of knowledge. On the other hand, it has the advantage of not having yet exploited a greater stock of useable knowledge available in the world. Hence, there are two possible cases. When the returns are greater in the poor region, we obtain the following results: (i) the rich location grows slower; (ii) the transfers to the poor location enhances the country’s growth rate; and (iii) there is a positive amount of transfers to the poor region that is welfare improving. When the returns are greater in the rich region, the …rst two results are reversed and transfers to the rich region are welfare improving. In both cases, the optimal amount of transfer increases with the level of income disparity across regions and is not dependent on the level of the country’s economic development (measured by its income per capita). Barriers to the adoption of new technology available in the world can constrain the convergence process as it harms in greater length the poor region. The results do not change whether migration is allowed or not.

Generalists versus specialists in organizations

In this paper, we discuss the trade-o¤ between specialization and coordination in an organizational design problem. Most papers on the assignment of heterogeneous managers to di¤erent hierarchic levels emphasize the role of talent: better managers should be on top of hierarchies. However, this requires talent to be measured on an one-dimensional scale. In this paper, we explore the implications of allowing talent to have two dimensions: breadth and depth. Specialists have deep knowledge of few areas while generalists have narrow knowledge of many areas. When perfect communication is impossible, hierarchies arise in which generalists are at the top and specialists are at the bottom. We propose a model of imperfect communication and discuss its implications for organizational design, the optimal degree of centralization and the depth of hierarchies. We show that our model also implies plausible organizational structures, like balanced hierarchies and pyramidal structures.

Does money in schools matter? evaluating the effects of FUNDEF on wages and test scores in Brazil

In this paper we investigate the effects of the 1998 reform in the funding of fundamental education in Brazil (FUNDEF) on the relative wages of public school teachers and on the relative proficiency of public school pupils. The evidence suggests that, on average, FUNDEF raised the public school teachers’ relative wages and improved the relative proficiency of the public school students. Some indirect evidence was presented that showed that the effect of FUNDEF on proficiency seems to be related to its effect on wages and on school characteristics. The effect on proficiency seems to be concentrated in the municipal schools in the Northeast of the country.

Technical change and factor shares

The implications of technical change that directly alters factor shares are examined. Such change can lower the income of some factors of production even when it raises total output, thus offering a possible explanation for episodes of social conflict such as the Luddite uprisings in 19th century England and the recent divergence in the U. S. between wages for skilled and unskilled labor. An explanation also why underdeveloped countries do not adopt the latest technology but continue to use outmoded production methods. Total factor productivity is shown to be a misleading measure of technical progress. Share-altering technical change brings into question the plausibility of a wide class of endogenous growth models.

Monopoly rights can reduce income big time

We study a two–sector version of the neoclassical growth model with coalitions of factor suppliers in the capital producing sectors. We show that if the coalitions have monopoly rights, then they block the adoption of the efficient technology. We also show that blocking leads to a decrease in the productivity of each capital producing sector and to an increase in the relative price of capital; as a result the capital stock and the production fall in each sector. We finally show that the implied fall in the level of per–capita income can be large quantitatively.

Dois em cada três usuários de transporte coletivo se sentem insatisfeitos com serviços públicos, indica pesquisa da DAPP

Dados retirados do jornal O Globo.

Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in pollution intensity

Environmental policy affects the distribution of market shares if intermediate goods are differentiated in their pollution intensity. When innovations are environment-friendly, a tax on emissions skews demand towards new goods which are the most productive. In this case, the tax has to increase along a balanced growth path to keep the market shares of goods of different vintages constant. Comparing balanced growth paths, we find that an increase in the burden of environmental taxation spurs innovation because it increases the market share of recent vintages. As a result the cost of environmental policy in terms of slower growth is weaker and may even be absent.

The long-run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV / AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV / AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.

Optimal water use: is anyone getting the right incentives in California?

This paper discusses ~he widespread inefficiency in water pricing today and uses the State of California as an example. After solving the Planner' s Problem I conclude that water for irrigation should cost more than for domestic use. The optimal price leveI can be calculated from a correct measure of the true marginal cost of supply.