How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Gestão de capital de giro na internacionalização das empresa : uma análise comparativa entre empresas locais e multinacionais

O objetivo desta pesquisa é testar empiricamente se a gestão de capital de giro adotada pelas empresas multinacionais em outros países se altera na internacionalização em países complexos como o Brasil. Baseado nas respostas a um questionário obtido de uma amostra de 182 empresas do setor eletroeletrônico, elétrico, e de máquinas e equipamentos do Brasil, testes foram conduzidos para encontrar correlação na decisão de uso de cessão de direitos creditórios com a distância psíquica e o tempo de experiência dessas empresas no Brasil. Resultados apontam a maior propensão no uso de cessão de direitos creditórios como ferramenta alternativa de financiamento de curto prazo pelas empresas multinacionais sediadas em países mais distantes psiquicamente e com menor tempo de experiência no Brasil. Estudos sobre finanças internacionais indicam que uma maior distância psíquica das empresas multinacionais aumenta a aversão a incertezas e riscos, e, logo, a necessidade de manutenção de maiores níveis de caixa. Dependendo do tempo de experiência das empresas no mercado estrangeiro, a distância psíquica pode ser minimizada por meio de um processo de aprendizagem organizacional.

A bidimensional model of matching in the marriage market with women labor decision

We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional attributes, one continuous (income) and the other dichotomous (home ability). Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources and female labor participation. Our model is able to predict partial non-assortative matching, with rich men marrying women with low income but high home ability. We then perform numerical exercises to evaluate the impacts of income taxes in individual welfare and find that there is considerable divergence in the female labor participation response to taxes between the short run and the long run.

Paixão empreendedora: neoliberalismo, capital humano e processos seletivos de trainees

O neoliberalismo, do ponto de vista econômico e social, pode ser entendido como a instauração, na sociedade, de relações estritamente mercantis, fazendo com que a lógica da maximização do ganho e do rendimento seja estendida a todos os campos, promovendo a racionalidade econômica como forma de racionalidade em geral. A forma de governamentalidade neoliberal norte-americana, com sua pretensão de transmutar os indivíduos em sujeitos-microempresas e as relações humanas em relações de tipo concorrencial, faz com que os indivíduos passem a ser vistos como “capital humano”. Originalmente, o termo “capital humano” remete a uma teoria que, desenvolvida sob influência do paradigma econômico neoclássico e liderança de Theodore Schultz, foi responsável por assimilar e transferir princípios econômicos para uma realidade anteriormente isenta de significados dessa natureza, fazendo emergir um discurso que associa o humano ao capital, transportando-o, dessa forma, para uma lógica onde ele deve gerir a si mesmo, tal como uma empresa. A empresa é, assim, promovida a modelo de subjetivação, sendo cada indivíduo um capital a ser gerenciado e valorizado conforme as demandas do mercado. É por isso que o modelo de conduta empreendedora, advindo do discurso do capital humano de inspiração neoliberal e de teorias clássicas propostas por Werner Sombart e Joseph A. Schumpeter, acomete os profissionais das organizações sediadas nos países capitalistas. Esse fato é bastante expressivo entre os jovens que procuram inserir-se no mercado de trabalho, principalmente em posições estratégicas valorizadas dentro das organizações, como as de trainee. No Brasil, os programas de trainee são considerados uma estratégia de busca de atração de jovens com perfil diferenciado, sendo uma resposta encontrada por muitas organizações desde 1970 para ganhar vantagem em um cenário econômico altamente competitivo. Esses profissionais são vistos como os “talentos” da organização, sendo treinados para ocuparem cargos estratégicos em um curto espaço tempo. A fim de esclarecer de que maneira o modelo de conduta empreendedora está presente nos processos seletivos de trainee, foi realizada uma análise dos textos que descrevem as competências exigidas na seleção desses jovens, a partir da Análise Crítica do Discurso (ACD) de Fairclough (2001, 2003), a partir das categorias analíticas “modalidade” e “avaliação”, e reflexões acerca da ideologia neoliberal. Chegou-se à conclusão de que o modelo de conduta empreendedora que está presente nos processos seletivos de trainee é marcada pela expressão de um comportamento apaixonado, que, no campo do management, é entendido a partir do conceito de “paixão empreendedora”. A pesquisa desenvolvida é relevante para o campo da Administração, tanto para o campo acadêmico (uma vez que há poucos estudos que têm como objeto de pesquisa a seleção de trainees e que procuram entendê-lo a partir de um viés crítico utilizando-se da análise do discurso do capital humano), como para quem está inserido nas organizações e convive com as dificuldades e desafios de selecionar jovens para programas de trainees, já que levanta questões importantes sobre os impactos dessas iniciativas tanto para os jovens, como para as organizações que os contratam.