Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions

This article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget. We show that states can use their financiaI institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal govemment. As a result, there is a bias towards Iarge deficits and high inflation rates. Our model also predicts that state owned financiaI institutions should underperform the market, mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non-performing loans to their own shareholders, that is, the states. Brazil and Argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions .

Speculative attacks, openness and crises

In this paper we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate financial adjustments that some emerging market economies went through to overcome external crises during the latest decades, such as default and local currency devaluation. We assume that real devaluation can be used to avoid external debt default, to improve trade balance and to reduce the real public debt level denominated in local currency. Such effects increase the government ability to deal with external crisis, but also have costs in terms of welfare, related to expected inflation, reductions in private investments and higher interest to be paid over the public debt. We conclude that openness improves expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology against crises. We also present results for 32 middle-income countries, verifying that the proposed model can indicate, in a stylized way, the preferences for default-devaluation options and the magnitude of the currency depreciation required to overcome 48 external crises occurred as from 1971. Finally, as we construct our model based on the Cole-Kehoe self-fulfilling debt crisis model ([7]), adding local debt and trade, it is important to say that their policy alternatives to leave the crisis zone remains in our extended model, namely, to reduce the external debt level and to lengthen its maturity.

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation

The literature on the welfare costs of in‡ation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a single-unity or for a multi-unity transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of in‡ation. Second, we derive su¢cient conditions that make the welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) robust under this alternative setting. Third, we compare our general-equilibrium measure with Bailey’s (1956) partial-equilibrium one.

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation (Revised Version, Forthcoming 2006, Estudos Econômicos)

The literature on the welfare costs of ináation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a one-person or for a many-person transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of ináation. Second, more importantly, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) are robust (invariant) under the number of persons considered in the household. Third, we show that Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of ináation can be obtained as a Örst-order approximation of the general-equilibrium welfare measure derived in this paper using a many-person transacting technology.

Price setting and macroeconomic variables: evidence from Brazilian CPI

Esta tese investiga as estratégias de precificação em ambientes macroeconômicos distintos, utilizando uma base de dados única para o IPC da Fundação Getulio Vargas. A base de dados primária consiste em um painel de dados individuais para bens e serviços representando 100% do IPC para o período de 1996 a 2008. Durante este período, diversos eventos produziram uma variabilidade macroeconômica substancial no Brasil: duas crises em países emergentes, uma mudança de regime cambial e monetário, racionamento de energia, uma crise de expectativas eleitorais e um processo de desinflação. Como consequência, a inflação, a incerteza macroeconômica, a taxa de câmbio e o produto exibiram uma variação considerável no período. No primeiro capítulo, nós descrevemos a base de dados e apresentamos as principais estatísticas de price-setting para o Brasil. Em seguida, nos capítulos 2 e 3, nos construímos as séries de tempo destas estatísticas e das estatísticas de promoções, e as relacionamos com as variáveis macroeconômicas utilizando análises de regressões. Os resultados indicam que há uma relação substancial entre as estatísticas de price-setting e o ambiente macroeconômico para a economia brasileira.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Bailey's rule for the welfare of inflation: a theoretical foundation

This paper demonstrates that for a very general class of monetary models (the Sidrauski type models and the cash-in-advance models), Bailey’s rule to evaluate the welfare efect of infation is in deed accurate. The result applies for any technology or preference, if the long-run capital stock does not depend on the ination rate. In general, a dynamic version of Bailey’s rule is established. In particular, the result extends to models in which there is a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services. A dditionally, it is argued that the relevant money demand concept for this issue- the impact of in ination under welfare- is the monetary base.

Welfare costs of inflation when interest-bearing deposits are disregarded: a calculation of the bias

Most estimates of the welfare costs of in ation are devised considering only noninterest- bearing assets, ignoring that since the 80s technological innovations and new regulations have increased the liquidity of interest-bearing deposits. We investigate the resulting bias. Suscient and necessary conditions on its sign are presented, along with closed-form expressions for its magnitude. Two examples dealing with bidimensional bilogarithmic money demands show that disregarding interest-bearing monies may lead to a non-negligible overestimation of the welfare costs of in ation. An intuitive explanation is that such assets may partially make up for the decreased demand of noninterest-bearing assets due to higher in ation.

Welfare characterization of monetary-applied models and three implications

This paper demonstrates that the applied monetary models - the Sidrauski-type models and the cash-in-advance models, augmented with a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services - imply trajectories which are Pareto-Optimum restricted to a given path of the real quantity of money. As a consequence, three results follow: First, Bailey’s formula to evaluate the welfare cost of inflation is indeed accurate, if the longrun capital stock does not depend on the inflation rate and if the compensate demand is considered. Second, the relevant money demand concept for this issue - the impact of inflation on welfare - is the monetary base. Third, if the long-run capital stock depends on the inflation rate, this dependence has a second-order impact on welfare, and, conceptually, it is not a distortion from the social point of view. These three implications moderate some evaluations of the welfare cost of the perfect predicted inflation.

Stochastic growth and monetary policy: the impacts on the term structure of interest rates

This paper builds a simple, empirically-verifiable rational expectations model for term structure of nominal interest rates analysis. It solves an stochastic growth model with investment costs and sticky inflation, susceptible to the intervention of the monetary authority following a policy rule. The model predicts several patterns of the term structure which are in accordance to observed empirical facts: (i) pro-cyclical pattern of the level of nominal interest rates; (ii) countercyclical pattern of the term spread; (iii) pro-cyclical pattern of the curvature of the yield curve; (iv) lower predictability of the slope of the middle of the term structure; and (v) negative correlation of changes in real rates and expected inflation at short horizons.

Measures of the welfare cost of inflation: a complete ordering

This paper presents three contributions to the literature on the welfare cost of ináation. First, it introduces a new sensible way of measuring this cost - that of a compensating variation in consumption or income, instead of the equivalent variation notion that has been extensively used in empirical and theoretical research during the past fiftt years. We Önd this new measure to be interestingly related to the proxy measure of the shopping-time welfare cost of ináation introduced by Simonsen and Cysne (2001). Secondly, it discusses for which money-demand functions this and the shopping-time measure can be evaluated in an economically meaningful way. And, last but not least, it completely orders a comprehensive set of measures of the welfare cost of ináation for these money-demand specification. All of our results are extended to an economy in which there are many types of monies present, and are illustrated with the log-log money-demand specification.

Tayloring Brazil: a system dynamics model for monetary policy feedback

The thesis introduces a system dynamics Taylor rule model of new Keynesian nature for monetary policy feedback in Brazil. The nonlinear Taylor rule for interest rate changes con-siders gaps and dynamics of GDP growth and inflation. The model closely tracks the 2004 to 2011 business cycle and outlines the endogenous feedback between the real interest rate, GDP growth and inflation. The model identifies a high degree of endogenous feedback for monetary policy and inflation, while GDP growth remains highly exposed to exogenous eco-nomic conditions. The results also show that the majority of the monetary policy moves during the sample period was related to GDP growth, despite higher coefficients of inflation parameters in the Taylor rule. This observation challenges the intuition that inflation target-ing leads to a dominance of monetary policy moves with respect to inflation. Furthermore, the results suggest that backward looking price-setting with respect to GDP growth has been the dominant driver of inflation. Moreover, simulation exercises highlight the effects of the new BCB strategy initiated in August 2011 and also consider recession and inflation avoid-ance versions of the Taylor rule. In methodological terms, the Taylor rule model highlights the advantages of system dynamics with respect to nonlinear policies and to the stock-and-flow approach. In total, the strong historical fit and some counterintuitive observations of the Taylor rule model call for an application of the model to other economies.

Essays on monetary and banking theory

Esta tese de Doutorado é dedicada ao estudo de instabilidade financeira e dinâmica em Teoria Monet ária. E demonstrado que corridas banc árias são eliminadas sem custos no modelo padrão de teoria banc ária quando a popula ção não é pequena. É proposta uma extensão em que incerteza agregada é mais severa e o custo da estabilidade financeira é relevante. Finalmente, estabelece-se otimalidade de transições na distribui ção de moeda em economias em que oportunidades de trocas são escassas e heterogêneas. Em particular, otimalidade da inflação depende dos incentivos dinâmicos proporcionados por tais transi ções. O capí tulo 1 estabelece o resultado de estabilidade sem custos para economias grandes ao estudar os efeitos do tamanho populacional na an álise de corridas banc árias de Peck & Shell. No capí tulo 2, otimalidade de dinâmica é estudada no modelo de monet ário de Kiyotaki & Wright quando a sociedade é capaz de implementar uma polí tica inflacion ária. Apesar de adotar a abordagem de desenho de mecanismos, este capí tulo faz um paralelo com a an álise de Sargent & Wallace (1981) ao destacar efeitos de incentivos dinâmicos sobre a interação entre as polí ticas monet ária e fiscal. O cap ítulo 3 retoma o tema de estabilidade fi nanceira ao quanti car os custos envolvidos no desenho ótimo de um setor bancário à prova de corridas e ao propor uma estrutura informacional alternativa que possibilita bancos insolventes. A primeira an álise mostra que o esquema de estabilidade ótima exibe altas taxas de juros de longo prazo e a segunda que monitoramento imperfeito pode levar a corridas bancárias com insolvência.

Inflation when the planner wants less spending

I study optima in a random-matching model of outside money. The examples in this paper show a conflict between private and collective interests. While the planner worry about the extensive and intensive margin effects of trades in a steady state, people want the exhaust the gains from trades immediately, i.e., once in a meeting, consumers prefer spend more for a better output than take the risk of saving money and wait for good meetings in the future. Thus, the conflict can force the planner to choose allocations with a more disperse money distribution, mainly if people are im- patient. When the patient rate is low enough, the planner uses a expansionary policy to generate a better distribution of money for future trades.