The effect of financiaI repression & enforcernent on entrepreneurship and economic deveIopment

This paper studies the effect of financiaI repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium mo deI with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financiaI frictions: intermediation costs and financiaI contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and the credit market frictions. The mo deI shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financiaI frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financiaI frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States. The results depend critically on whether à general equilibrium factor price effect is operative, which in turn depends on whether financiaI markets are open or closed. This yields a positive policy prescription: If the goal is to maximize steady-state efficiency, financial reforms should be accompanied by measures to increase financiaI capital mobility.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Job destruction and propagation of shocks

We develop and quantitatively implement a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market matching and endogenous deterllÚnation of the job destruction rate. The mo deI produces a elose match with data on job creation and destruction. Cyelical fluctuations in the job destruction rate serve to magnify the effects of productivity shocks on output; as well as making the effects much more persistent. Interactions between the labor and capital markets, mediated by the rental rate of capital, play the central role in propagating shocks.

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

City sizes and industry concentration

In a general equilibrium model of trade under transportation costs between two cities we show how the relative population sizes are simultaneously determined with the degree of geographic concentration of industries characterized by different elasticities of scale of production. The effect on city size of the presence of nontraded goods is also analyzed .

Demand-pull stagflation

This paper explores the possibility of stagflation emanating exc1usively from monetaJy sbocks, without concurrent supply shocks or shifts in potential output. This arises in connection with a tight money paradox. in the context of a fiscal theory of the price leveI. The paper exhibits perfect foresight equilibria with output and inflation fluctuating in opposite direetions as a consequence of small monetary shocks, and also following changes in monetaJy policy regime that launch the economy into hyperinflation or that produce dramatic stabilization of already high inflation. For that purpose, an analytically convenient dynamic general equilibrium macro model is deve10ped wbere nominal rigidities are represented by a cross between staggered two-period contracts and state dependent price adjustment in the presence of menu costs.

Rational expectations and the service of public debt: a recursive approach

This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Mobility, targeting and private school vouchers

This paper uses general equilibrium simulations to explore the role ofresidential mobility in shaping the impact of different types of private school voucher policies. In particular, general vouchers available to all residents in the state are compared to vouchers specifically targeted to either underprivileged school districts or underprivileged households. The simulations are derived from a three-community mo deI of low, middle and high income school districts (calibrated to New York data), where each school district is composed of multiple types of neighborhoods that may vary in house quality as well as the leveI of neighborhood extemalities. Households that differ in both their income and in the ability leveI of their children choose between school districts, between neighborhoods within their school district, and between the local public school or a menu of private school altematives.Local public school quality within a district is endogenously determined bya combination of the average peer quality of public school attending children as well as local property and state income tax supported spending. Financial support (above a required state minimum) is set by local majority rule. Finally, there exists the potential for a private school market composed of competitive schools that face production technologies similar to those ofpublic schools but who set tuition and admissions policies to maximize profits. In tbis model, it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to non-targeted vouchers but vastIy different from vouchers targeted to low income households. Furthermore, strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs.

Welfare and growth effects of alternative fiscal rules for infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the interplay between fiscal rules, public investment and growth in Brazil. It is investigated if it would make sense to raise public investment and, if so, under which fiscal rule it is best to do it — whether through tax financing, debt financing, or a reduction of public consumption. We construct and simulate a competitive general equilibrium model, calibrated to Brazilian economy, in which public capital is a component of the production function and public consumption directly affects individuals’ well-being. After assessing the impacts of alternative fiscal rules, the paper concludes that the most desirable financing scheme is the reduction of public consumption, which dominates the others in terms of output and welfare gains. The model replicates the observed growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy when we increase taxes and reduce public capital formation to the levels observed after 1980 and shows that the growth impact of the expansion of tax collection in Brazil was much larger than that of public investment compression.

Business cycles in emerging economies : the role of interest rates

This paper documents the empirical relation between the interest rates that emerging economies face in international capital markets and their business cycles. It shows that the patterns observed in the data can be interpreted as the equilibrium of a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy, in which (i) firms have to pay for a fraction of the input bill before production takes place, and (ii) preferences generate a labor supply that is independent of the interest rate. In our sample, interest rates are strongly countercyclical, strongly positively correlated with net exports, and they lead the cycle. Output is very volatile and consumption is more volatile than output. The sample includes data for Argentina during 1983-2000 and for four other large emerging economies, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Philippines, during 1994-2000. The model is calibrated to Argentina’s economy for the period 1983-1999. When the model is fed with actual US interest rates and the actual default spreads of Argentine sovereign interest rates, interest rates alone can explain forty percent of output fluctuations. When simulated technology shocks are added to the model, it can account for the main empirical regularities of Argentina’s economy during the period. A 1% increase in country risk causes a contemporaneous fall in output of 0.5 ’subsequent recovery. An increase in US rates causes output to fall by the same on impact and by almost 2% two years after the shock. The asymetry in the effect of shocks to US rates and country risk is due to the fact that US interest rates are more persistent than country risk and that there is a significant spillover effect from US interest rates to country risk.

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

The risk-incentive trade-off in competitive search

Usando a abordagem de competitive search, modelo um mercado de trabalho com trabalhadores heterogêneos no qual há um problema de risco moral na relação entre firmas e trabalhadores. Nesse contexto, consigo prever como contratos reagem a mudanças nos parâmetros do mercado (em particular, o risco de produção), assim como a variação da probabilidade dos trabalhadores serem contratados. Minha contribuição principal é ver que, no nível individual, existe uma relação negativa entre risco e incentivos, mas efeitos de equilíbrio geral implicam que essa relação pode ser positiva no nível agregado. Esse resultado ajuda a esclarecer resultados empíricos contraditórios sobre a relação entre risco e incentivos.

Terms of trade, macroeconomic dynamics and default decisions

A evidência empírica aponta que Termos de Troca é uma variável relevante tanto para dinâmica macroeconômica como para o risco de default em países emergentes. No entanto, a literatura de dívida soberana baseada nos trabalhos de Eaton e Gerzovitz (1981) e Arellano (2008) ainda não explorou de forma adequada as conecções entre a dinâmica de termos de troca e incentivos ao default. Nós contribuímos nessa área, introduzindo volatilidade de Termos de Troca no modelo proposto por Mendoza e Yue (2012), no qual as decisões de dívida soberana são vinculadas à um modelo de equilíbrio geral para a economia doméstica. Nós encontramos que uma economia exposta à volatilidade dos termos de troca consegue produzir uma variabilidade do consumo que supera significativamente a variabilidade do produto, característica que constitui um fato estilizado chave de business cycles de países emergentes. Nossos exercícios também mostram que decisões de default são geradas por mudanças bruscas nos termos de troca, mas não necessariamente estão vinculados à estados ruins da economia.

The long term effects of Bolsa Família on child labour and school enrolment

In this paper we study the e ects of conditional cash transfers in school enrolment and tackling child labour. We develop a dynamic heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model, where households face a set of tradeo s while allocating their children's time in leisure activities, schooling and working. We calibrate the model using data from the Brazilian survey PNAD, before the policy was implemented, in order to quantify the e ects of a conditional transfer. We then evaluate the results of a policy experiment that implements a conditional cash transfer scheme similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Fam lia. Our results suggest that the program, in the long term, is able to substantially increase school registration and reduce child labour and poverty. In addition, we nd out that a progressive conditional cash transfer results is even more e ective in tackling child labour and increasing school enrolment.