Diretrizes para a elaboração de um novo manual do liquidante da SUSEP

As intervenções do Poder Público em entidades privadas são necessárias em certas circunstâncias. Independentemente do tipo de intervenção, os agentes intervenientes devem zelar pelo interesse público e esforçar-se para que a intervenção ocorra na medida necessária, com qualidade e com eficiência. Será abordado assunto relacionado à intervenção do Poder Público, na figura da Superintendência de Seguros Privados (Susep), autoridade que recebeu do Ministério da Fazenda competências de controlar, regular e fiscalizar importantes instituições: seguradoras, resseguradores locais, entidades abertas de previdência complementar e entidades de capitalização. Nesse contexto, os estudos se restringirão à Liquidação Extrajudicial, intervenção que ocorre quando há indícios de crises econômicofinanceiras, de insolvência ou de gestão, dentre outras circunstâncias. A Susep nomeia um liquidante para executar os procedimentos e acompanha a respectiva gestão, cujo foco principal deve ser a quitação das dívidas com os credores. Tem sido observada baixa eficiência na gestão das entidades em Liquidação Extrajudicial, o que pode em parte relevante ser decorrente da falta de diretrizes para a elaboração de um Manual do Liquidante que induza a práticas eficientes de gestão. É, pois, objetivo desse trabalho propor diretrizes para a elaboração desse Manual. A metodologia de pesquisa será a revisão bibliográfica, pesquisa documental e a coleta da opinião de liquidantes e de especialistas em Liquidação Extrajudicial. Será pesquisado como algumas autoridades nacionais ou internacionais lidam com a Liquidação Extrajudicial. Acreditamos que o assunto aqui tratado é de grande relevância social, pois ineficiências na execução dessas Liquidações Extrajudiciais podem prejudicar credores, acionistas e gerar desperdícios de tempo e de recursos do Poder Público quando do acompanhamento do regime liquidatário. No final do trabalho encontramos o resultado da pesquisa: as diretrizes propostas para a elaboração do novo Manual do Liquidante da Susep.

Microinsurance: income risk, social security and the demand for private onsurance by low-income families

Insurance provision against uncertainties is present in several dimensions of peoples´s lives, such as the provisions related to, inter alia, unemployment, diseases, accidents, robbery and death. Microinsurance improves the ability of low-income individuals to cope with these risks. Brazil has a fairly developed financial system but still not geared towards the poor, especially in what concerns the insurance industry. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The Brazilian government provides a relatively developed social security system considering other countries of similar income level which crowds-out the demand for insurance and savings. On the other hand, this same public infrastructure may help to foster microfinance products supply. The objective of this paper is to analyze the demand for different types of private insurance by the low-income population using microdata from a National Expenditure Survey (POF/IBGE). The final objective is to help to understand the trade-offs faced for the development of an emerging industry of microinsurance in Brazil.

Cyclicality of SME Lending and Government Involvement in Banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

Cyclicality of SME lending and government involvement in banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

A note on Brazilian financial regulation and governance

The question posed by Theme 4 of this workshop is indeed a very broad one and would demand a thorough research on the topics involved. I am afraid I did not have the proper time to think it over and I would not be able to provide a wide ranging answer to this question. Thus, I will be selective and I will present the following issues that need to be addressed to support Brazilian development: i) competition among banks; ii) high rate of interest on liquidity; iii) approval by the Congress of a Complementary Law to regulate the financial sector as required by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution; iv) exploitation of workers through the governance of the Job Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS) and iv) state-owned versus government owned enterprises.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Alocação de riscos e equilíbrio econômico-financeiro em contratos de gestão: o caso da fundação OSESP

As parcerias entre o governo e instituições da sociedade civil têm se mostrado um instrumento fundamental para a consecução das políticas públicas. O “Programa Nacional de Publicização”, focalizando os serviços públicos não-exclusivos, trouxe maior possibilidade de flexibilização da gestão dessas atividades, chamando as organizações do terceiro setor a um papel de protagonismo na oferta de serviços públicos no Brasil. A nova interação entre esses agentes cria a necessidade de melhor entendimento de suas relações jurídicas e de realinhamento de expectativas e incentivos, bem como melhor definição da alocação de riscos entre os parceiros. Este trabalho analisa as parcerias com as Organizações Sociais na área da Cultura no Estado de São Paulo. Mais especificamente, o contrato de gestão da Fundação Osesp no período de 2005 a 2015. A partir desse caso, analisamos as oportunidades e dificuldades encontradas na contratualização dos resultados, os impactos na governança corporativa da instituição, as condições de alocação dos riscos, suas formas de mitigação e as necessidades de reequilíbrio econômico-financeiro.