A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Contagion in financial networks: a network theory and agent-based approaches to modeling the spread of risk in financial systems

Esta dissertação estuda a propagação de crises sobre o sistema financeiro. Mais especi- ficamente, busca-se desenvolver modelos que permitam simular como um determinado choque econômico atinge determinados agentes do sistema financeiro e apartir dele se propagam, transformando-se em um problema sistêmico. A dissertação é dividida em dois capítulos,além da introdução. O primeiro capítulo desenvolve um modelo de propa- gação de crises em fundos de investimento baseado em ciência das redes.Combinando dois modelos de propagação em redes financeiras, um simulando a propagação de perdas em redes bipartites de ativos e agentes financeiros e o outro simulando a propagação de perdas em uma rede de investimentos diretos em quotas de outros agentes, desenvolve-se um algoritmo para simular a propagação de perdas através de ambos os mecanismos e utiliza-se este algoritmo para simular uma crise no mercado brasileiro de fundos de investimento. No capítulo 2,desenvolve-se um modelo de simulação baseado em agentes, com agentes financeiros, para simular propagação de um choque que afeta o mercado de operações compromissadas.Criamos também um mercado artificial composto por bancos, hedge funds e fundos de curto prazo e simulamos a propagação de um choque de liquidez sobre um ativo de risco securitizando utilizado para colateralizar operações compromissadas dos bancos.