A comparison of test of non-linear cointegration with an application to the predictability of US interest rates using the term structure

We evaluate the forecasting performance of a number of systems models of US shortand long-term interest rates. Non-linearities, induding asymmetries in the adjustment to equilibrium, are shown to result in more accurate short horizon forecasts. We find that both long and short rates respond to disequilibria in the spread in certain circumstances, which would not be evident from linear representations or from single-equation analyses of the short-term interest rate.

Debt management in Brazil: evaluation of the Real Plan and challenges ahead

The Brazilian domestic debt has posed two challenges to policy-makers: it has grown very fast and its maturity is extremely short. This has prompted fears that a default or a compulsory lengthening scheme would be imposed. Here, we analyse the domestic public debt management experience in Brazil, searching for policy prescriptions for the next few years. After briefiy reviewing the recent domestic public debt history, we decompose the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-2000, searching for its macroeconomic causes. The main culprits are the extremely high interest payments-which, unti11998, were caused by the weak fiscal stance and the quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime; and since 1999, by the impact ofthe currency depreciation On the dollar-indexed and the externai debt-, and the accumulation of assets of doubtful value, much of which may have to be written off in the future. Simulation exercises of the net debt path for the near future underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to prevent the debt-GDP ratio from growing further. Given the need to quickly lengthen the debt maturity, our main policy advice is to foster, and rely more on, infiation-linked bonds.

Aggregate vs disaggregate data analysis: a paradox in the estimation of money demand function of Japan under the low interest rate policy

We investigate the issue of whether there was a stable money demand function for Japan in 1990's using both aggregate and disaggregate time series data. The aggregate data appears to support the contention that there was no stable money demand function. The disaggregate data shows that there was a stable money demand function. Neither was there any indication of the presence of liquidity trapo Possible sources of discrepancy are explored and the diametrically opposite results between the aggregate and disaggregate analysis are attributed to the neglected heterogeneity among micro units. We also conduct simulation analysis to show that when heterogeneity among micro units is present. The prediction of aggregate outcomes, using aggregate data is less accurate than the prediction based on micro equations. Moreover. policy evaluation based on aggregate data can be grossly misleading.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

The role of venture capitalists in the identification and measurement of intangible assets

The increase in the importance of intangibles in business competitiveness has made investment selection more challenging to investors that, under high information asymmetry, tend to charge higher premiums to provide capital or simply deny it. Private Equity and Venture Capital (PE/VC) organizations developed contemporarily with the increase in the relevance of intangible assets in the economy. They form a specialized breed of financial intermediaries that are better prepared to deal with information asymmetry. This paper is the result of ten interviews with PE/VC organizations in Brazil. Its objective is to describe the selection process, criteria and indicators used by these organizations to identify and measure intangible assets, as well as the methods used to valuate prospective investments. Results show that PE/VC organizations rely on sophisticated methods to assess investment proposals, with specific criteria and indicators to assess the main classes of intangible assets. However, no value is given to these assets individually. The information gathered is used to understand the sources of cash flows and risks, which are then combined by discounted cash flow methods to estimate firm's value. Due to PE/VC organizations extensive experience with innovative Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), we believe that shedding light on how PE/VC organizations deal with intangible assets brings important insights to the intangible assets debate.

Life Cycle Models, Heterogeneity of Initial Assets,and Wealth Inequality

Life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this article, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data - and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets, which is estimated using a non-parametric method applied to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets.

Influência das principais commodities agropecuárias e de variáveis macroeconômicas sobre os preços da terra agrícola no Brasil

Este trabalho tem como proposta investigar como o preço de terras de uso rural no Brasil é afetado pelos preços e exportações das principais commodities agropecuárias, bem como por variáveis macroeconômicas, como taxa básica de juros, taxa de câmbio, taxa de inflação e disponibilidade de crédito agrícola. Para tal foram consideradas as produções agrícola de algodão, café, cana-de-açúcar (e seus principais produtos açúcar e etanol), milho e soja, a produção pecuária de carne bovina e a produção industrial de celulose de fibra curta com foco em sua principal matéria prima, os plantios reflorestados de eucalipto. Em linha com estudos anteriores, foi encontrada evidência empírica de que o preço da terra possui cointegração com algumas das variáveis agrícolas, pecuárias e florestais citadas, em especial em estados com maior vocação agropecuária e/ou para silvicultura. Quanto às variáveis macroeconômicas, apenas a taxa básica de juros apresentou cointegração com o preço de terras para todos os estados avaliados, taxa de câmbio e disponibilidade de crédito rural não aparecem como variáveis estatisticamente significantes. Conclui-se que, para estados com notável participação na balança comercial brasileira de produtos agrossilvipastoris, é possível obter um modelo de equilibro de longo prazo entre o preço da terra de uso rural e as variáveis destacadas acima, de modo que investidores do setor possam utilizá-lo como ferramenta de projeção no auxílio da tomada de decisão além de avaliar potenciais impactos no valor de seus ativos A inovação do presente estudo está em testar as hipóteses de cointegração para cada um dos estados da federação.

Show me the money and I will bring you the head: evaluation of the effects of self-interest and anger on whistleblowing

Though many of those who decided to report wrongdoings in their organizations were able to tell their stories (e.g. Bamford, 2014, Armenakis 2004), it is fair to say that there is still much left to uncover. The paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, it provides preliminary evidence that the wrongdoing linked with individual financial loss leads to higher whistleblowing rate. Secondly, it shows how the experience of anger is related to the higher likelihood to report the wrongdoer but only if the wrongful act is perceived as a cause of one’s financial loss. Finally, the paper establishes first steps for the future development of an experimental procedure that would enable to predict, and measure whistleblowing behavior in the lab environment.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.