Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Computerization, occupational tasks and the labor market : evidence from a natural experiment in Brazil

A hipótese de “rotinização" ou estabelece que computadores substituem tarefas rotineiras e complementam tarefas abstratas não rotineiras. Essa dissertação de mestrado test algumas predições naturais sobre o impacto “rotinização" sobre o mercado de trabalho de uma grande economia em desenvolvimento. Uso o final da política de reserva de mercado para mini e micro-computador (Outubro de 1992) como um experimento natural que gera variação exógena nos preços de tecnologia para identificar os efeitos do uso de computadores em salários e insumos de trabalho. Conjuntamente, os resultados contribuem para a crescente literatura sobre “perspectiva das tarefas" por trazer implicações testáveis de um queda exógena de preços de computador em um contexto com uma estratégia de identificação crível.

A bidimensional model of matching in the marriage market with women labor decision

We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional attributes, one continuous (income) and the other dichotomous (home ability). Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources and female labor participation. Our model is able to predict partial non-assortative matching, with rich men marrying women with low income but high home ability. We then perform numerical exercises to evaluate the impacts of income taxes in individual welfare and find that there is considerable divergence in the female labor participation response to taxes between the short run and the long run.