Do capital controls boost resilence to crises?

Os controles de capitais estão novamente em voga em razão dos países emergentes reintroduzirem essas medidas nos últimos anos face a abundante entrada de capital internacional. As autoridades argumentam que tais medidas protegem as economias no caso de uma “parada abrupta” desses fluxos. Será demonstrado que os controles de capitais parecem fazer com que as economias emergentes (EMEs) fiquem mais resistentes diante de uma crise financeira (por exemplo, uma queda na atividade econômica seguida de uma crise é menor quando o controle é maior). No entanto, os controles de capitais parecem deixar as economias emergentes (EMEs) também mais propícias a uma crise. Deste modo, as autoridades devem ser cautelosas na avaliação quanto aos riscos e benefícios relativos a aplicação das medidas dos controles de capitais.

Impacto da emissão dual-class na estrutura de capital

A tese propõe que empresas que emitem apenas ações com direitos de voto utilizam mais capitais de terceiros do que empresas que emitem tanto ações votantes quanto não votantes. No desenvolvimento do trabalho, foi demonstrada a relevância de relacionar endividamento ao fato de uma empresa emitir ou não ações sem direito a voto, considerando as principais teorias de estrutura de capital e a realidade brasileira. Como os modelos teóricos que explicam o nível de endividamento das empresas ainda carecem de capacidade explicativa, a busca por novos determinantes está presente na literatura de estrutura de capital. A ocorrência da emissão de ações em classes diferenciadas (dual-class) como fator impactante no nível de endividamento foi analisada sob três prismas: de mercado, dos setores e das empresas que unificaram suas ações. Pelas três investigações ficou evidenciada a perspectiva de que o endividamento seja menor nos casos de emissão de ações preferenciais, considerando o ambiente de negociação e regulamentação do Brasil. A aceitação da tese tem reflexos teóricos na identificação de um fator que deve ser levado em consideração nos modelos de estrutura de capital, bem como suscita a importância de gestores, investidores e credores reconhecerem que o fato de uma empresa ser dual-class impacta não apenas na sua estrutura de controle, mas principalmente em sua estrutura de capital. Entre as considerações da aceitação da tese, estaria o reconhecimento de que empresas que ingressam no Novo Mercado na prática estão, no longo prazo, trocando o uso de ações preferenciais como forma de financiamento pela emissão de dívida.

Capital bancário e crédito: um estudo empírico no mercado brasileiro de 2003 a 2012

Este trabalho realiza um teste empírico associando capital bancário e oferta de crédito livre no mercado brasileiro de 2003 a 2012. Em uma primeira etapa, propõem-se a estimativa do capital alvo, ativamente gerenciado pelos bancos de acordo com seu risco, características idiossincráticas e expectativas; e o cálculo do capital excedente a partir deste capital alvo. Na segunda etapa, investiga-se se este capital excedente e outros indicadores de capital associam-se com o crescimento do crédito livre. Os resultados indicam relação positiva, mas economicamente modesta (contrariando a premissa da alavancagem constante), entre o crescimento do crédito livre e o capital excedente. A relação é mais forte na segunda parte do período de análise, de setembro de 2008 a dezembro de 2012. O crescimento do crédito livre e os indicadores contábeis (Patrimônio Líquido sobre Ativo Total e índice de Basileia) apresentam relação positiva neste segundo período, também com efeitos econômicos modestos. Nos bancos públicos, não se encontrou relação significante entre o capital excedente – assim como entre os outros indicadores de capital – e o crescimento do crédito livre.

Assessing Dodd Frank Effects on banking capital structure and Banker´s Pay structure

The systemic financial crisis that started in 2008 in the United States had some severe effects in the economic activity and required the bailout of financial institutions with the use of taxpayer’s money. It also originated claims for stronger regulatory framework in order to avoid another threat in the financial market. The Dodd Frank Act was proposed and approved in the United States in the aftermath of the crisis and brought, among many other features, the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the tougher inspection of financial institutions with asset above 50 billion dollars. The objective of this work is to study the causal effect of the Dodd Frank Act on the behavior of the treatment group subject to monitoring by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (financial institutions with assets above 50 billion dollars) regarding capital and compensation structure in comparison to the group that was not treated. We use data from Compustat and our empirical strategy is the Regression Discontinuity Design, not usually applied to the banking literature, but very useful for the present work since it allows us to compare the treatment group and the non-treatment group in the year of the enactment of the law (2010). No change of behavior was observed for the Capital Structure. In the Compensation Schemes, however, a decrease was found in the item other compensation for CEOs and CFOs. We also performed a robustness check by running a placebo test on the variables in the year before the law was enacted. No significance was found, which supports the conclusion that our main results were caused by the enactment of the DFA.

Do capital controls boost EME´s resilience to financial crises?

Capital controls are again in vogue as a number of emerging markets have reintroduced these measures in recent years in response to a “flood” of international capital. Policymakers use these tools to buttress their economies against the “sudden stop” risk that accompanies international capital flows. Using a panel VAR model, we show that capital controls appear to make emerging market economies (EMEs) more resistant to financial crises by showing that lower post-crisis output loss is correlated with stronger capital controls. However, EMEs that employ capital controls seem to be more crisis-prone. Thus, policymakers should carefully evaluate whether the benefits of capital controls outweigh their costs.

A onda de abertura de capital de bancos no Brasil

Esse estudo investiga a onda de IPOs de bancos brasileiros de 2005 a 2007. Verificou-se que os bancos que fizeram IPO apresentam características ex-ante diferentes de bancos de mesmo porte e tipo de atuação que permaneceram com capital fechado, como maior rentabilidade, maior parcela de seus ativos aplicados em operações de crédito, menor proporção de créditos não performados e mais restrição de capital. Esses resultados mostram que a onda de abertura de capital de bancos não pode ser explicada pela teoria comportamental, e são resultado das oportunidades de crescimento distintas desses bancos em relação a seus concorrentes. Dessa forma, a liquidez de mercado deve ser entendida como condição necessária, mas não suficiente, para explicar os IPOs desses bancos. A evidência encontrada sobre o efeito da abertura de capital no desempenho operacional desses bancos sugere um aumento na proporção créditos-ativos, associado a um aumento na proporção de créditos de pior qualidade, mesmo controlado pelo boom de crédito ocorrido nesse período. Também se percebe uma melhora na eficiência administrativa, o que pode indicar economias de escala nos bancos que realizaram IPO.

Mitigating high ‘equity capital’ risk exposure to ‘small cap’ sector in India: analysing ‘key factors of success’ for ‘Institutional Investors’ whilst Investing in small cap sector in India

This paper deals with the subject of mitigating high ‘Equity Capital’ Risk Exposure to ‘Small Cap’ Sector in India. Institutional investors in India are prone to be risk averse when it comes to investing in the small cap sector in India as they find the companies risky and volatile. This paper will help analyse ‘Key Factors of success’ for ‘Institutional Investors’ whilst investing in Small Cap sector in India as some of these Indian small cap stocks offer handsome returns despite economic downturn. This paper has been harnessed carefully under the influence of expert investors, which includes Benjamin Graham (Security Analysis); Warren Buffet; Philip Fisher (Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits); and Aswath Damodaran.

Toward convergence? The brazilian stock market concentration and the role of private equity in its diversification

Using quantitative data obtained from public available database, this paper discusses the difference between of the Brazilian GDP and the Brazilian Stock Exchange industry breakdown. I examined if, and to what extent, the industry breakdowns are similar. First, I found out that the Stock Exchange industry breakdown is overwhelming different from the GDP, which may present a potential problem to asset allocation and portfolio diversification in Brazil. Second, I identified an important evidence of a convergence between the GDP and the Stock Exchange in the last 9 years. Third, it became clear that the Privatizations in the late 90’s and IPO market from 2004 to 2008 change the dynamics of the Brazilian Stock Exchange. And fourth, I identified that Private Equity and Venture Capital industry may play an important role on the portfolio diversification in Brazil.

Liquidity proxies in the Brazilian debenture market

Este estudo analisa as variáveis de liquidez no mercado corporativo brasileiro de debêntures e testa a variável Eurobond para compreender quais características ajudam a prever a liquidez de debêntures. Embora os mercados de capitais brasileiros tenham melhorado drasticamente nos últimos anos, as grandes empresas brasileiras têm muitas opções na hora de tomar a decisão de aumentar capital (emissão de Eurobônus é um deles). Este estudo busca preencher uma lacuna na literatura acadêmica vendo se existe uma relação de liquidez entre os dois mercados. O proxy Eurobond foi encontrado significativo ao nível de 5% e o nível de 1%. Os outras proxies que foram significativos (valor de emissão, data de vencimento inicial, Avaliação) coincidem com os resultados de estudos anteriores.

Do firms always want to learn from corporate venture capital investments?

In this paper, the learning intentions and outcomes for corporate venture capital are questioned. Through qualitative research in the oil and gas sector, we identified a desire to control the direction and pace of innovation as the main driver for this type of investments. A new model and framework for CVC are presented. Contrary to the traditional model of CVC, which features a dyadic relation between corporate investor and venture entrepreneur, our model shows that CVC investments create a more complex conjoint of relations between multiple stakeholders. These relations challenge the neo-Schumpeterian model of competition. Using the grounded theory approach, we created a theoretical framework explaining and predicting outcomes of corporate venture capital other than learning. At firm level, our framework conceptualizes CVC programs as dynamic capabilities, and suggests a competitive advantage for the corporate investor through its ability to faster and better integrate the new technology. At market level, we proposed that CVC investments positively affect the pace of innovation in the market through an increased speed of acceptance of technologies supported by corporate investors.

Desafios na avaliação de incorporadoras imobiliárias brasileiras de capital aberto

Primeiramente, além de fazer análise resumida do setor de incorporação imobiliária brasileiro, a dissertação argumenta porque métodos tradicionais de valuation são inapropriados para avaliar incorporadoras e construtoras brasileiras. Entre os pontos levantados estão: as regras contábeis do setor, o modelo de negócios de incorporação no Brasil, a natureza cíclica do negócio, o descasamento entre geração de caixa e reconhecimento de receitas, e o tipo de informação disponibilizada pelas empresas listadas na bolsa de valores. Em seguida, o estudo sugere um método mais adequado, partindo de um conceito de Soma das Partes, onde calcula-se separadamente o valor líquido dos ativos, do banco de terrenos e dos projetos futuros. Metodologias semelhantes começaram a ser utilizadas por alguns bancos de investimento em anos recentes, porém nunca foram discutidas de forma mais acadêmica. Argumenta-se que o método proposto parece adequado, pois não só produz resultados compatíveis com a intuição econômica, como também permite que o usuário faça análises de sensibilidade de forma simples e direta. Finalmente, ao comparar a evolução no período entre 2008 e 2014 dos preços das ações de algumas incorporadoras imobiliárias listadas, discute-se quais ações estariam subavaliadas e quais estariam superavaliadas.

Capital structure in Brazil : review of studies during the period of 1988-2003

A systematic review was made of studies regarding the capital structure in Brazil during the period of 1988-2003. The recurring themes relate to the static tradeoff and pecking order in various moments of the economy, the fiscal benefits of indebtedness and interest on privately-owned capital, and the inefficacies of the stock market. The Brazilian companies enjoy little leverage as compared to other emerging markets. BNDES is responsible for 5% of the gross formation of fixed capital. The funding of resources occurs at opportune moments, and the financing decision may precede that of investment. Efficacy of the judiciary system and company transparency positively affect access to credit.

A influência da alavancagem financeira na construção do custo de capital próprio: um estudo voltado para o mercado brasileiro

No contexto do Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), este trabalho investiga a significância da alavancagem financeira na construção do risco sistemático. Testamos com dados brasileiros o procedimento de desalavancagem e realavancagem do beta comumente realizado por analistas financeiros para a construção do custo de capital próprio de empresas não negociadas em bolsa de valores. Os resultados apontam que a inclusão do tax shield na fórmula de desalavancagem/realavancagem e a utilização de valores de mercado produzem resultados mais robustos, ao passo que as divisões por setores possuem pouca capacidade como segmentadores de classe de risco sistemático.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.