O Supremo Tribunal Federal e a instabilidade politico institucional

Nosso propósito neste trabalho é focalizar o comportamento do Supremo Tribunal Federal dentro de urna época ainda não estudada pela escassa literatura sobre a mais Alta Corte de Justiça brasileira a fase histórica 1964/1975. Fixa-se ele mais dentro do campo da Ciência política e referir-se-a a fatos, relações, tipos de pressões, de apoio , de solicitação que originem as deliberações, crises e reações do Supremo Tribunal Federal enfim, a mecânica extrínseca e intrínseca de seu funcionamento, ao sabor do amaranhado de um sistema político, do qual faz parte, influenciando-o e sendo por ele influenciado.

As expectativas e experiências dos cadetes da Força Aérea frente a instituição e ao seu currículo

Este trabalho consiste no confronto entre as expectativas dos alunos e o currículo oferecido pela AFA, compreendendo tanto a formação como o futuro desempenho profissional dos alunos. Entre os objetivos do trabalho destacam- se: 1º) Identificar a proposta dos cursos oferecidos pela AFA, seus respectivos objetivos, carga horária , etc.; 2º) Identificar a percepção que os alunos e professores têm de sua formação acadêmica e preparo especifico de especialização 3º) Fornecer subsídios para uma possível revisão da proposta curricular da AFA.

Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados , 1989 to 1999

This paper examines the structure of agenda power in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chose to form such an alliance—a presidentially-led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that would pass and split the governing coalition. We find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentiallyled agenda cartel. In this sense, our argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. Our results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

Bens credenciais e poder de mercado : um estudo econométrico da indústria farmacêutica brasileira

The Brazilian pharmaceutical industry has always been targeted by the society, due to the ethical drugs’ high weight in the families’ consumption budgets (especially within the poorer ones) and price raises traditionally above inflation (when the government does not run a price control). The present article aims to organize the debate on regulation for this industry. We review the literature on market failures and regulation solutions adopted for this industry worldwide and try to relate empirically drug prices to some explaining variables, based on original microdata. We find that, similarly to previous U.S. estimations, Brazilian leading brand name drugs – before a 1999 law, which created officially the generic drug defined by its bioequivalence to the reference drug, and a massive advertisement campaign for spreading use of generic drugs, run by the Ministry of Health – accommodated entry and share growth of the followers by raising their prices and catering to a more inelastic market segment. As opposed, the followers reduce relative prices when they lose market. Therefore, a fall of the concentration index in a particular segment has ambiguous effects: if it is due to reduced leader power, the followers raise their relative prices; if it is due to a tougher competition within the fringe, relative prices tend to go down.