Addressing important econometric issues on how to construct theoretical based exchange rate misalignment estimates

Exchange rate misalignment assessment is becoming more relevant in recent period particularly after the nancial crisis of 2008. There are di erent methodologies to address real exchange rate misalignment. The real exchange misalignment is de ned as the di erence between actual real e ective exchange rate and some equilibrium norm. Di erent norms are available in the literature. Our paper aims to contribute to the literature by showing that Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate approach (BEER) adopted by Clark & MacDonald (1999), Ubide et al. (1999), Faruqee (1994), Aguirre & Calderón (2005) and Kubota (2009) among others can be improved in two following manners. The rst one consists of jointly modeling real e ective exchange rate, trade balance and net foreign asset position. The second one has to do with the possibility of explicitly testing over identifying restrictions implied by economic theory and allowing the analyst to show that these restrictions are not falsi ed by the empirical evidence. If the economic based identifying restrictions are not rejected it is also possible to decompose exchange rate misalignment in two pieces, one related to long run fundamentals of exchange rate and the other related to external account imbalances. We also discuss some necessary conditions that should be satis ed for disrcarding trade balance information without compromising exchange rate misalignment assessment. A statistical (but not a theoretical) identifying strategy for calculating exchange rate misalignment is also discussed. We illustrate the advantages of our approach by analyzing the Brazilian case. We show that the traditional approach disregard important information of external accounts equilibrium for this economy.

Exchange rate misalignments and international trade policy: impacts on tariffs

The debate on “exchange wars and trade wars” is raising the attention of experts on international trade and economics. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on one of the most traditional trade policy instruments – tariffs, as defined by the WTO – World Trade Organization. It is divided into three sections: the first one examines the effects of exchange rate variations on tariffs and its consequences for the multilateral trade system; the second explains the methodology used to determine exchange rate misalignments and also presents its results for Brazil, US and China; and the third summarizes the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of “misalignment tariffication”

Neutralizing the tendency to the overvaluation of the exchange rate or assuming a foreign constraint and asking for foreign savings

The objectives of these notes are two. The first objective is to analyze whether the strategy of growth with absorption of foreign savings leads to a trajectory of the economy that is sustainable in the long run. The second one is to evaluate the possibility of success of a policy of administered devaluation of the exchange rate in Brazil.

Trade rules and exchange rate misalignments : in search for a WTO solution e medidas compensatórias

The debate on the link between trade rules and rules on exchange rates is raising the attention of experts on international trade law and economics. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs as applied by the WTO – World Trade Organization. It is divided into five sections: the first one explains the methodology used to determine exchange rate misalignments and also presents its results for Brazil, US and China; the second summarizes the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of “misalignment tariffication”; the third examines the effects of exchange rate variations on tariffs and their consequences for the multilateral trading system; the fourth one creates a methodology to estimate exchange rates against a currency of the World and a proposal to deal with persistent and significant misalignments related to trade rules. The conclusions are present in the last section

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.