The analysis of foreign market entry strategies on the basis of different cultural backgrounds and environments: a qualitative study characterising the differences and similarities of Brazilian and European firms

Moving into a new and foreign market can be challenging, especially when such market has a different culture and working environment in comparison to the home market. Thus, it is of utter importance to adjust a company’s strategy to the new market conditions. Currently, there are no concrete guidelines of what aspects are most important when moving from a developing market such as Brazil into a more sophisticated market like Europe, or vice versa. The present study will examine two companies from the same industry, but with different cultural backgrounds and its strategic similarities and differences for operating in multiple international markets. The data was collected via semi-structured interviews with the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs’) from both companies, using an interview guideline that is based on three different theoretical frameworks. The aim is to give recommendations to these two industries of how to efficiently use existing theoretical frameworks and which aspects are most significant when moving into a new market while keeping in mind a company’s size and background.

Neutralizing the tendency to the overvaluation of the exchange rate or assuming a foreign constraint and asking for foreign savings

The objectives of these notes are two. The first objective is to analyze whether the strategy of growth with absorption of foreign savings leads to a trajectory of the economy that is sustainable in the long run. The second one is to evaluate the possibility of success of a policy of administered devaluation of the exchange rate in Brazil.

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.