Neighborhood feedbacks, endogenous stratification, and income inequality

This paper explores the evolution of the cross-section income distribution in economies where endogenous neighborhood formation interacts with positive within-neighborhood feedback effects. We study an economy in which the economic success of adults is determined by the characteristics of the families in the neighborhood in which a person grows up. These feedbacks take two forms. First, the tax base of a neighborhood affects the leveI of education investment in offspring. Second, the effectiveness of education investment is affected by a neighborhood's in come distribution, reflecting factors such as role model or labor market connection effects. Conditions are developed under which endogenous stratification, defined as the tendency for families wi th similar incomes to choose to form common communities, will occur. When families are allowed to choose their neighborhoods, wealthy families will have an incentive to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. This resulting stratification is supported by house price differences between ricli and poor communities. Endogenous stratification can lead to pronounced intertemporal inequality as different families provide very different interaction environments for offspring. When the transformation of human capital into in come exhibits constant retums to scale, cross-section in come differences may also grow across time. As a result, endogenous stratification and neighborhood feedbacks can interact to produce long run inequality.

On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

The distribution of average and marginal effective tax rates in European Union member states

Macro-based summary indicators of effective tax burdens do not capture differences in effective tax rates facing different sub-groups of the population. They also cannot provide information on the level or distribution of the marginal effective tax rates thought to influence household behaviour. I use EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model, to compute distributions of average and marginal effective tax rates across the household population in fourteen European Union Member States. Using different definitions of ‘net taxes’, the tax base and the unit of analysis I present a range of measures showing the contribution of the tax-benefit system to household incomes, the average effective tax rates applicable to income from labour and marginal effective tax rates faced by working men and women. In a second step, effective tax rates are broken down to separately show the influence of each type of tax-benefit instrument. The results show that measures of effective tax rates vary considerably depending on incomes, labour market situations and family circumstances. Using single averages or macro-based indicators will therefore provide an inappropriate picture of tax burdens faced by large parts of the population.

Reforma tributária no Brasil: histórico, necessidades e propostas

O presente trabalho aborda o processo de reforma tributária no Brasil. Partimos da análise dos principais fatos da história econômica do país que justificaram a reforma tributária de 1966. Após, elencamos as principais alterações ocorridas na legislação tributária no período entre a instituição do Código Tributário Nacional (1966) e a promulgação da Constituição Federal de 1988, que representa a última grande reforma tributária no Brasil. Estudamos as mudanças ocorridas na legislação tributária no período pós 1988, afim de se verificar a necessidade de reforma tributária no sistema brasileiro atual. Concluímos pela necessidade de reforma tributária no Brasil sob seis diferentes aspectos: federalismo, orçamento, renda, patrimônio, consumo e contribuições sociais. Analisamos as propostas de reforma tributária, elaboradas pelo Poder Executivo no período pós 1988 até o ano de 2008, de forma a examinar se tais propostas contemplavam as necessidades de reforma tributária apontadas. Indagamos o porquê de tais propostas não terem sido aprovadas, de forma que, nos dias atuais, o país ainda necessita de outra reforma tributária.

Ao Ministério Público da união e à Receita Federal brasileira, tudo? uma análise crítica à lei complementar 105 de 2001 como possível meio de coibir o crime de Sonegação Fiscal

O trabalho de conclusão de curso tem como objetivo central a análise crítica da Lei Complementar nº 105 de 2001- que autoriza a Receita Federal do Brasil a quebrar diretamente o sigilo bancário dos contribuintes, com base em possíveis indícios de omissões, fraudes e simulações- como meio hábil para coibir o crime de sonegação fiscal. A partir dessa análise, vamos testar a hipótese de que nenhum agente público pode determinar a quebra das informações bancárias de um contribuinte, sem a prévia autorização do Poder Judiciário. O artigo tem três partes. Na primeira, os principais conceitos que envolvem o sigilo bancário e as possíveis exceções à quebra do sigilo bancário são descritas e discutidas. A partir do exame conceitual, vamos estudar a correlação desse assunto com o combate à sonegação fiscal e a afirmação do princípio da transparência fiscal na comunidade internacional. Na última parte, somos chamados a estudar a opinião da Suprema Corte quanto ao objeto do presente trabalho. A conclusão a que se chega é a de que os agentes públicos não podem obter as referidas informações sem prévia autorização de um juiz. Contudo, a matéria apesar de muito antiga, ainda é polêmica para a doutrina e a jurisprudência. Além disso, a alteração na composição do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de 2010 para 2015, pode indicar uma mudança também no entendimento dos magistrados quanto ao assunto.