Price discovery in dual-class shares across multiple markets

We extend the standard price discovery analysis to estimate the information share of dual-class shares across domestic and foreign markets. By examining both common and preferred shares, we aim to extract information not only about the fundamental value of the rm, but also about the dual-class premium. In particular, our interest lies on the price discovery mechanism regulating the prices of common and preferred shares in the BM&FBovespa as well as the prices of their ADR counterparts in the NYSE and in the Arca platform. However, in the presence of contemporaneous correlation between the innovations, the standard information share measure depends heavily on the ordering we attribute to prices in the system. To remain agnostic about which are the leading share class and market, one could for instance compute some weighted average information share across all possible orderings. This is extremely inconvenient given that we are dealing with 2 share prices in Brazil, 4 share prices in the US, plus the exchange rate (and hence over 5,000 permutations!). We thus develop a novel methodology to carry out price discovery analyses that does not impose any ex-ante assumption about which share class or trading platform conveys more information about shocks in the fundamental price. As such, our procedure yields a single measure of information share, which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system. Simulations of a simple market microstructure model show that our information share estimator works pretty well in practice. We then employ transactions data to study price discovery in two dual-class Brazilian stocks and their ADRs. We uncover two interesting ndings. First, the foreign market is at least as informative as the home market. Second, shocks in the dual-class premium entail a permanent e ect in normal times, but transitory in periods of nancial distress. We argue that the latter is consistent with the expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class.

Taxing hard-to-tax markets

Tax enforcement costs constrain the government s ability to observe economic transactions, giving rise to hard-to-tax (HTT) markets. In these markets transactions are untaxed and consumers are better o¤ than in taxed markets. This paper studies a novel approach to combat evasion in HTT markets: consumer auditing, which rewards consumers for re- questing transaction receipts. We develop a Hotelling-type spatial model of sales taxation to analyze the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the implementation of this policy. We and that consumer auditing allows for a lower tax rate and greater provision of the public good in the economy. We show that this policy not only can enhance welfare, but also equalize utilities of consumers across markets

Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

Nesta dissertação, consideram-se trocas em mercados descentralizados com seleção adversa. Diferentemente da literatura até o momento, supomos que vendedores informados (e não compradores desinformados) fazem ofertas take-it-or-leave-it, de forma que sinalização através de preços é possível. Estabelecemos uma caracterização parcial do conjunto de equilíbrio, encontramos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de um equilíbrio e mostramos que todo equilíbrio apresenta sinalização se o problema de seleção adversa for suficientemente severo. Além disso, provamos o resultado surpreendente que o maior bem-estar atingido em equilíbrio é invariante às fricções do mercado. Também apresentamos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de equilíbrios separantes, que caracterizamos completamente. Mostramos que o conjunto de payoffs associados a equilíbrios separantes é invariante às fricções. Concluímos com uma caracterização completa do conjunto de equilíbrio com apenas dois tipos, e comparamos nossos resultados com os de Moreno e Wooders (2010), que analisam o caso em que compradores têm todo o poder de mercado. Nossos resultados mostram que sinalização através dos preços tem um impacto não trivial tanto nos resultados do mercado quanto no bem-estar.

The impact of price expectations on consumer's behavior in frequently purchased goods markets: empirical evidence and implications

Este trabalho investiga como os padrões de compras de consumidores de bens estocáveis são afetados por suas expectativas de preços. Usando um modelo dinâmico padrão de maximização da utilidade, deriva-se uma expressão analítica para as compras dos consumidores como uma função das suas expectativas em relação aos preços futuros. Em seguida, uma versão mais tratável do modelo é construída, de forma a ilustrar graficamente como os diferentes tipos de expectativas de preços implicam diferentes padrões de compras dos consumidores. Além disso, na aplicação empírica, investigo qual o modelo de expectativas de preços, entre aqueles comumente utilizados na literatura, é consistente com os dados. Por fim, encontra-se suficiente heterogeneidade em expectativa de preços dos consumidores. Mostra-se que famílias de pequeno porte acreditam que os preços seguem um processo de Markov de primeira ordem, enquanto famílias de alta renda são racionais.

Market coupling in the power markets

The thesis analyses the European Unions’ effort to create an integrated pan-European electricity market based on “market coupling” as the proposed allocation mechanism for interconnector transfer capacity. Thus, the thesis’ main focus is if market coupling leads to a price convergence in interlinked markets and how it affects the behavior of electricity price data. The applied research methods are a qualitative, structured literature review and a quantitative analysis of electricity price data. The quantitative analysis relies on descriptive statistics of absolute price differentials and on a Cointegration analysis according to Engle & Granger (1987)’s two step approach. Main findings are that implicit auction mechanisms such as market coupling are more efficient than explicit auctions. Especially the method of price coupling leads to a price convergence in involved markets, to social welfare gains and reduces market power of producers, as shown on the example of the TLC market coupling. The market coupling initiative between Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, is evaluated as less successful and illustrates the complexity and difficulties of implementing market coupling initiatives. The cointegration analysis shows that the time series were already before the coupling date cointegrated, but the statistical significance increased. The thesis suggests that market coupling leads to a price convergence of involved markets and thus functions as method to create a single, integrated European electricity market.

Partial economic reforrns and financial crises: an emerging markets perspective

The recent emerging market experiences have posed a challenge to the conventional wisdom that unsustainable fiscal deficits are the key to understanding financial crises in these countries. The health of the domestic banking system has emerged as the main driving force behind the perverse dynamics of partial reforms. The current paper shares this view and uses a model of contractual inefliciencies in the banking sector to understand the dynamics of these reforms. We find that the threat of a large exchange rate devaluation depends on the stock of international reserves relative to the stock of domestic credit that must be extended by the Central Bank in response to a large capital outflow. Moreover, if a country has a weak banking sector but high net reserve ratios, the capital flow reversal might only increase the vulnerability to a currency crisis without necessarily causing it. The results are in accordance with much of the empiricalliterature on the determinants of financiaI crises in emerging markets. Some aspectsof the recent policy debate on the introduction of capital controls are also analysed.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derivecommodity taxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods - those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty - and show that tax prescriptions are also analogous to the existing literature. The robustness of tax rules across these setups is explained by the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.

Market coupling in the power markets

A dissertação analisa o esforço dos sindicatos europeus para criar um mercado pan- europeu de electricidade integrada baseada em "mercados combinados", como o mecanismo de alocação de capacidade de transferência de energia entre diferentes sistemas. Assim, o foco principal do estudo é se a integração do mercado leva a uma convergência de preços nos mercados interligados, e como isso afeta o comportamento dos preços de energia elétrica. Os métodos de investigação são uma revisão bibliográfica estruturada qualitativa e uma análise quantitativa de dados de preços de energia elétrica. A análise quantitativa se baseia em estatísticas descritivas das diferenças de preços absolutos e em uma análise de cointegração de acordo com a abordagem de Engle e Granger (1987). As principais conclusões são que os mecanismos de leilões implícitos, tais como a integração de mercado são mais eficientes que os leilões explícitos. Especialmente, o método de acoplamento de preços leva a uma convergência de preços nos mercados envolvidos, a ganhos de bem-estar social e reduz a o poder dos produtores no mercado, como mostra o exemplo da integração mercado TLC. A iniciativa mercados combinados entre a Alemanha ea Dinamarca, por outro lado, é avaliada como de menor sucesso e ilustra a complexidade e as dificuldades de implementação de iniciativas de integração de mercado. A análise de cointegração mostra que as séries temporais já estavam cointegradas antes da data de integração, mas a significância estatística aumentou. A tese sugere que a integração do mercado leva a uma convergência dos preços dos mercados envolvidos e, portanto, funciona como método para criar um mercado de eletricidade único e integrado na Europa.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.