O prêmio de risco da taxa de câmbio no Brasil durante o plano real

A principal explicação sugerida pela literatura para o viés do preço futuro em relação à taxa de câmbio que prevalecerá no futuro é a existência de um prêmio de risco. Aplicamos aqui os principais modelos teóricos e técnicas econométricas para identificação e mensuração do prêmio de risco aos dados brasileiros do mercado futuro de câmbio posteriores ao Plano Real. Identifica-se um prêmio de risco que varia ao longo do tempo, o qual correlaciona-se com os fundamentos macroeconômicos da economia. A partir de 1999, coerentemente com a introdução da livre flutuação cambial, observou-se uma diminuição da importância do prêmio de risco relativamente aos erros de previsão na composição do forward discount. As técnicas empregadas permitem-nos avaliar importantes questões de política econômica, como o quanto podem cair as taxas de juros reais.

Valuation and performance of firms in complex ownership structures : an application to Korean chaebols

We propose several new metrics to describe the complex ownership structure of business groups, and provide simple formulas and algorithms to compute these metrics. We use these measures to describe in detail the ownership structure of Korean chaebols in the period of 2003 to 2004. In addition, we validate the usefulness of our new metrics by showing empirically that they are important for understanding the valuation and performance of group firms. In particular, we show evidence that firms that are central to the control structure of the chaebol (central firms), firms in cross-shareholdings, and firms that are placed at the bottom of the group (i.e., with lower ultimate ownership) have lower profitability than other group firms. The valuation results suggest that central firms and firms in cross-shareholding loops have lower valuations than other public Chaebol firms. The lower valuation of these firms is not explained by variation in measures of ownership concentration and separation between ownership and control.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

Informational spillovers in the pre-1914 London sovereign debt market

We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis. We interpret it as evidence that the identity of the financial intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the soundness of a debtor based on the existence of financial relationships. This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance, in this case, underwriting, helps alleviate informational and incentive problems.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Resposta gerencial à ruptura: o efeito de compensações no comportamento do consumidor

A falta de estoque continua sendo um problema no varejo. O progresso foi limitado, nos últimos quarenta anos as estimativas dos níveis de ruptura têm constantemente ultrapassado a média de 8,0 %. Hoje, como no passado, o gestor precisa lidar com o consumidor frente à ruptura. O propósito desta pesquisa foi investigar a eficácia de cinco formas de compensações: pedido de desculpas, vale, entrega em domicílio, troca por outro item de preço ligeiramente superior e desconto como um mecanismo para induzir o consumidor a não deixar a loja frente a uma ruptura. Além da reação geral do consumidor, também foi examinado como algumas características do consumidor (fidelidade a marca) e a situação da compra (urgência da compra) influenciam o efeito de cada forma de compensação na reação do consumidor. Em geral, os resultados do estudo mostraram que as compensações funcionam. O pedido de desculpas é a forma de compensação menos eficiente, aparentemente aumenta a percentagem de consumidores que deixam a loja em reação à ruptura Esta pesquisa sugere que existem oportunidades para varejistas utilizarem as compensações como mecanismo para gerenciar a ruptura.

Renegociação de dívidas e moral hazard: uma análise do efeito da política de descontos no pagamento de dívidas de cartões de crédito

O Brasil vem vivenciando um aumento na demanda por cartões de crédito, principalmente nas classes baixas. Entretanto, a população de menor renda e menor qualificação representa maior riscos para a operação. Este fato é evidenciado pelas altas taxas de inadimplência. Exposto isso, empresas se utilizam de estratégias de renegociação de dívida na tentativa de recuperar parte do investimento realizado. Entretanto, poucos foram os estudos acerca da consequência no longo prazo destas estratégias. Utilizando os experimentos realizados por uma empresa de cartão de crédito, cujas campanhas de renegociação variavam mês a mês, este estudo, procurou evidências de que as ofertas de renegociação de dívidas podem afetar a reputação da firma, fazendo com que clientes da rede mesma rede social deste que recebeu a oferta de renegociação também fiquem inadimplentes. Concluímos que o aumento do desconto nas negociações tem um efeito significativo sobre o incentivo do cliente em honrar suas obrigações junto a empresa, ou seja, o aumento de 0,01 p.p. no desconto dado aos clientes aumenta em 0,05 sua probabilidade em atrasar sua fatura no próximo período.

Os determinantes macroeconômicos do spread bancário para pessoas físicas e jurídicas no Brasil: uma análise do período pós plano real

Este trabalho tem por objetivo a análise empírica dos fatores macroeconômicos que determinaram os níveis de spread bancário para pessoas físicas e pessoas jurídicas no Brasil no período pós-adoção do Plano Real até dezembro de 2012. Para isso foi utilizado um modelo de auto regressão vetorial com variáveis representativas de fatores macroeconômicos. O Trabalho expõe ainda algumas características da indústria bancária no Brasil e as particularidades do mercado de crédito praticado para pessoas físicas e pessoas jurídicas. Os resultados deste trabalho evidenciaram que: (i) a taxa básica de juros foi o principal fator macroeconômico de influência do spread praticado tanto para pessoas físicas quanto para pessoas jurídicas; (ii) Enquanto um impacto no nível de inflação ocasionou maior influência no spread para pessoas físicas, um impacto na volatilidade da taxa básica de juros influenciou positivamente o spread para pessoas jurídicas.

Estimação do desconto de reequilíbrio ótimo em concessões rodoviárias através da metodologia das opções reais

Este trabalho propõe um novo modelo para avaliação, em tempo discreto, do desconto de reequilíbrio em contratos de concessão rodoviária, a partir de conceitos da Teoria Clássica de Finanças e da Teoria de Opções Reais. O modelo desenvolvido permitiu incorporar flexibilidades decorrentes de incertezas nas situações reais, como decisões gerenciais, vieses de comportamento e componentes políticos, comumente presentes em contratos de concessões rodoviária. Os resultados obtidos, utilizando-se como estudo de caso a BR-262, sinalizaram que há espaço para uma melhor intervenção regulatória com relação ao mecanismo do desconto de reequilíbrio, no sentido de prover melhores incentivos aos concessionários.

Nonparametric tail risk, macroeconomics and stock returns: predictability and risk premia

This paper proposes a new novel to calculate tail risks incorporating risk-neutral information without dependence on options data. Proceeding via a non parametric approach we derive a stochastic discount factor that correctly price a chosen panel of stocks returns. With the assumption that states probabilities are homogeneous we back out the risk neutral distribution and calculate five primitive tail risk measures, all extracted from this risk neutral probability. The final measure is than set as the first principal component of the preliminary measures. Using six Fama-French size and book to market portfolios to calculate our tail risk, we find that it has significant predictive power when forecasting market returns one month ahead, aggregate U.S. consumption and GDP one quarter ahead and also macroeconomic activity indexes. Conditional Fama-Macbeth two-pass cross-sectional regressions reveal that our factor present a positive risk premium when controlling for traditional factors.

Bias from ignoring price dispersion in demand estimation

Consumers often pay different prices for the same product bought in the same store at the same time. However, the demand estimation literature has ignored that fact using, instead, aggregate measures such as the “list” or average price. In this paper we show that this will lead to biased price coefficients. Furthermore, we perform simple comparative statics simulation exercises for the logit and random coefficient models. In the “list” price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers facing discount prices is higher and when consumers are more unwilling to buy the product so that they almost only do it when facing discount. In the average price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers that have access to discount are similar to the ones that do not have access and when consumers willingness to buy is very dependent on idiosyncratic shocks. Also bias is less problematic in the average price case in markets with a lot of bargain deals, so that prices are as good as individual. We conclude by proposing ways that the econometrician can reduce this bias using different information that he may have available.

On impatience, education, returns, and inequality

In this paper we investiga te the impact of initial wealth anel impatience heterogeneities, as wcll as differential access to financia! markets on povcrty anel inequality, anel cvaluate some mechanisms that could be used to alleviate situations in which these two issues are alarming. To address our qucstion we develop a dynamic stochastic general cquilibrium modo! of educational anel savings choicc with heterogeneous agents, where individuais differ in their initial wealth anel in their discount factor. We find that, in the long run, more patient households tend to be wealthier anel more educated. However, our baseline model is not able to give as much skewness to our income distribution as it is rcquircd. We then propose a novel returns structure based on empírica! observation of heterogeneous returns to different portfolios. This modification solves our previous problem, evidencing the importance of the changes made in explaining the existing levels of inequality. Finally, we introducc two kinds of cash transfers programs- one in which receiving thc benefit is conditional on educating the household's youngster (CCTS) anel one frec of conditionalities (CTS) - in order to evaluate the impact of these programs on the variables of concern1 Wc fine! that both policies have similar qualitativo rcsults. Quantitatively, howcvcr, the CCTS outperforms its unconclitional version in all fielcls analyzecl, revealing itself to be a preferable policy.

Impondo mais restrições ao modelo de apreçamento vetorial com séries temporais

Este Trabalho se Dedica ao exercício empírico de gerar mais restrições ao modelo de apreçamento de ativos com séries temporais desenvolvido por Hansen e Singleton JPE 1983. As restrições vão, desde um simples aumento qualitativo nos ativos estudados até uma extensão teórica proposta a partir de um estimador consistente do fator estocástico de desconto. As estimativas encontradas para a aversão relativa ao risco do agente representativo estão dentro do esperado, na maioria dos casos, já que atingem valores já encontrados na literatura além do fato destes valores serem economicamente plausíveis. A extensão teórica proposta não atingiu resultados esperados, parecendo melhorar a estimação do sistema marginalmente.

Exogenous shocks and misattribution of responsibility for economic performance: results from survey experiments

Recent models of economic voting assume that citizens can discount exogenous factors when assessing government's economic performance. Yet there is evidence that Latin American voters do not behave in such way, and attribute to presidents outcomes that are beyond their control. This paper presents three survey experiments designed to explore mechanisms that could potentially correct such misattribution, and therefore contribute to debiasing individual behavior towards government evaluation. Our results provide individual-level evidence of the misattribution found in aggregate studies of electorate behavior, and reinforce psychologist's skepticism towards prospects of mental decontamination, as we found very scant evidence that providing information, raising awareness, or increasing motivation to correct biases infuenced individual's evaluation of president's performance.