The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Cyclicality of SME lending and government involvement in banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

Asymetric price adjustment and loss aversion

Ajuste assimétrico de preço é observado em diversos mercados, notavelmente varejo de gasolina: um aumento de custo é passado para os consumidores mais rápido do que uma redução. Eu desenvolvo um modelo de busca dos consumidores que gera essa predição sob aversão à perda. Uma fração dos consumidores ignora os preços no mercado e pode adquirir informação a um custo, o que permite que as firmas tenham lucro com dispersão de preços. Ajuste assimétrico de preço emerge se os consumidores são aversos a perdas em relação a um preço de referência. Custos mais altos tornam os consumidores mais dispostos a procurar, mas também diminui as chances de encontrar preços baixos, gerando uma relação custo-preço convexa.