Market coupling in the power markets

A dissertação analisa o esforço dos sindicatos europeus para criar um mercado pan- europeu de electricidade integrada baseada em "mercados combinados", como o mecanismo de alocação de capacidade de transferência de energia entre diferentes sistemas. Assim, o foco principal do estudo é se a integração do mercado leva a uma convergência de preços nos mercados interligados, e como isso afeta o comportamento dos preços de energia elétrica. Os métodos de investigação são uma revisão bibliográfica estruturada qualitativa e uma análise quantitativa de dados de preços de energia elétrica. A análise quantitativa se baseia em estatísticas descritivas das diferenças de preços absolutos e em uma análise de cointegração de acordo com a abordagem de Engle e Granger (1987). As principais conclusões são que os mecanismos de leilões implícitos, tais como a integração de mercado são mais eficientes que os leilões explícitos. Especialmente, o método de acoplamento de preços leva a uma convergência de preços nos mercados envolvidos, a ganhos de bem-estar social e reduz a o poder dos produtores no mercado, como mostra o exemplo da integração mercado TLC. A iniciativa mercados combinados entre a Alemanha ea Dinamarca, por outro lado, é avaliada como de menor sucesso e ilustra a complexidade e as dificuldades de implementação de iniciativas de integração de mercado. A análise de cointegração mostra que as séries temporais já estavam cointegradas antes da data de integração, mas a significância estatística aumentou. A tese sugere que a integração do mercado leva a uma convergência dos preços dos mercados envolvidos e, portanto, funciona como método para criar um mercado de eletricidade único e integrado na Europa.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

Extreme observations and diversification in Latin American emerging equity markets

In this paper, we focus on the tails of the unconditional distribution of Latin American emerging markets stock returns. We explore their implications for portfolio diversification according to the safety tirst principIe, tirst proposed by Roy (1952). We tind that the Latin American emerging markets have signiticantly fatter tails than industrial markets. especially, the lower tail of the distrihution. We consider the implication of the safety tirst principIe for a U .S. investor who creates a diversitied portfolio using Latin American stock markets. We tind that a U.S. investor gains by adding Latin American equity markets to her purely domestic portfolio. For different parameter specitications. we finu a more realistic asset allocation than the one suggested by the Iiterature haseu on the traditional mean-variance framework.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Macroeconomic announcements, price discovery, and order flow efects in the stock market: evidence from incomplete data and multiple financial markets

This paper investigates heterogeneity in the market assessment of public macro- economic announcements by exploring (jointly) two main mechanisms through which macroeconomic news might enter stock prices: instantaneous fundamental news im- pacts consistent with the asset pricing view of symmetric information, and permanent order ow e¤ects consistent with a microstructure view of asymmetric information related to heterogeneous interpretation of public news. Theoretical motivation and empirical evidence for the operation of both mechanisms are presented. Signi cant in- stantaneous news impacts are detected for news related to real activity (including em- ployment), investment, in ation, and monetary policy; however, signi cant order ow e¤ects are also observed on employment announcement days. A multi-market analysis suggests that these asymmetric information e¤ects come from uncertainty about long term interest rates due to heterogeneous assessments of future Fed responses to em- ployment shocks.

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.