Análise dos recursos do Programa ABC : foco na Amazônia Legal – potencial de redução de GEE e estudo de caso sobre o Programa ABC em Paragominas

Este é o relatório final acerca do desembolso do Programa ABC e que compõe, entre outras, as atividades do segundo ano de trabalho do Observatório do Plano ABC. Seu principal objetivo é analisar quantitativa e qualitativamente o desempenho – contratação – da principal linha de crédito para o financiamento da agricultura de baixa emissão de carbono no Brasil, o Programa ABC. O relatório apresenta as atualizações referentes à parcela da safra 2014/15 (de julho de 2014 a fevereiro de 2015), trazendo, também, uma análise focada nos recursos contratados via BNDES e nas finalidades de investimento às quais se destinam. Além disso, é apresentado um estudo de caso realizado no estado do Pará, e é discutido, também, o potencial de contribuição ao alcance das metas de redução de emissões pela região da Amazônia Legal.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.